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The	   article	  discusses	   the	  development	   in	   the	   administration	  of	   the	   Slovak	   judiciary	   since	  
the	  separation	  of	  Czechoslovakia	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  empowerment	  of	  the	  judicial	  self-­‐
governance	   on	   the	   functioning	   of	   the	   judicial	   system.	   After	   independence,	   the	  
administration	   of	   the	   judiciary	   initially	   rested	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   the	   executive.	   In	   2002,	  
Slovakia	  created	  its	  Judicial	  Council	  and	  transferred	  a	  considerable	  amount	  of	  powers	  on	  it,	  
especially	   related	   to	   judicial	   careers.	   It	   was	   expected	   that	   this	   would	   de-­‐politicize	   the	  
judicial	   system.	   However,	   a	   high	   level	   of	   autonomy	   of	   the	   judiciary	   chiefly	   led	   to	   the	  
empowerment	   of	   judicial	   elites.	   This	   reduced	   the	   democratic	   accountability	   of	   the	  
judiciary,	   encapsulating	   it	   from	   society	   and	   enabling	   it	   to	   promote	   its	   own	   interests.	  
Selection	  processes	  have	  often	  been	  used	  to	  fill	  judicial	  ranks	  with	  judges	  with	  close	  ties	  to	  
the	   system.	   Accountability	   mechanisms	   such	   as	   promotions,	   disciplinary	   procedures	   or	  
remuneration	  schemes	  were	  used	  to	  reward	  allies	  of	  those	  on	  the	  top	  of	  the	  hierarchy	  and	  
to	  punish	  their	  critics.	  Still,	  adherence	  to	  EU-­‐backed	  standards	  on	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  
judiciary	  may	  have	  increased	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  judiciary,	  while	  concentrating	  decision-­‐
making	   in	   one	   body	   enhanced	   transparency,	   which	   was	   furthered	   due	   to	   low	   public	  
confidence	   resulting	   in	   unprecedented	   levels	   of	   information	   available	   about	   the	   Slovak	  
judicial	   system.	  All	   in	  all,	   the	  Slovak	  example	  displays	   the	  dangers	  of	  establishing	   judicial	  
self-­‐governance	  in	  countries	  where	  an	  internal	  ethical	  culture	  and	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  judicial	  
duty	  are	  still	  lacking.	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A.	  Introduction	  
	  
In	  less	  than	  30	  years	  since	  the	  breakdown	  of	  the	  communist	  regime,	  the	  administration	  of	  
the	   Slovak	   judiciary	   has	   gone	   through	   a	  much	   turbulent	   development.	   Starting	   from	  
a	  government	  controlled	  judiciary	  in	  the	  1990s,	  particularly	  under	  Prime	  Minister	  Vladimír	  
Mečiar,1	   the	   political	   branches	   enjoyed	   strong	   powers	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   judicial	   branch	   and	  
were	   not	   afraid	   to	   use	   them.2	   In	   2001,	   in	   compliance	   with	   recommendations	   from	   the	  
Council	  of	  Europe3	  and	  the	  European	  Commission,	  which	  exercised	  its	  pressure	  in	  the	  form	  
of	   the	   accession	   conditionality,4	   Slovakia	   eventually	   adopted	   the	   ‘Euro-­‐model’5	   of	   court	  
administration	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  Judicial	  Council,	  transferring	  considerable	  powers	  to	  the	  
judiciary,	   especially	   in	   the	  area	  of	  personnel	  policies.	   The	  empowerment	  of	   the	   judiciary	  
took	  place	  in	  a	  system	  where	  the	  legacies	  and	  legal	  culture	  of	  the	  communist	  regime	  have	  
easily	  survived.6	  This	  article	  examines	  different	  models	  of	   judicial	  administration	  adopted	  
in	  Slovakia,	  the	  reasons	  behind	  the	  major	  changes,	  and	  their	  effects	  on	  the	  functioning	  of	  
the	  judicial	  system,	  given	  the	  post-­‐communist	  context.	  Using	  the	  example	  of	  Slovakia,	  the	  
article	  aims	  to	  show	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  existence	  of	  a	   judicial	  council	  and	  
hence	  the	  separation	  of	  the	  judiciary	  from	  the	  influence	  of	  other	  branches	  of	  power	  is	  not	  
                                            
1	  There	  are	  many	   labels	  attached	   to	  Mečiar’s	   regime	   in	  Slovakia.	  Classifications	  differ	   from	  so-­‐called	  “laggards”	  
(ANDREW	   C.	   JANOS,	   EAST	   CENTRAL	   EUROPE	   IN	   THE	   MODERN	   WORLD:	   THE	   POLITICS	   OF	   THE	   BORDERLANDS	   FROM	   PRE-­‐	   TO	  
POSTCOMMUNISM	   (2000),	   “troubled	   democracies”	   (HERBERT	   KITSCHELT,	   POST-­‐COMMUNIST	   PARTY	   SYSTEMS:	   COMPETITION,	  
REPRESENTATION,	   AND	   INTER-­‐PARTY	   COOPERATION	   (1999),	   at	   42),	   and	   mixed	   cases	   (Commission	   on	   Security	   and	  
Cooperation	   in	   Europe,	   Human	   Rights	   and	   Democratization	   in	   Slovakia,	   (1997),	   Available	   at:	  
http://www.csce.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.Download&FileStore_id=267).	   See	   also	   VALERIE	   BUNCE	   AND	  
SHARON	   WOLCHIK,	   DEFEATING	   AUTHORITARIAN	   LEADERS	   IN	   POST-­‐COMMUNIST	   COUNTRIES	   (2011).	   Overall,	   the	   literature	  
agrees	  on	  the	  undemocratic	  character	  of	  the	  Slovak	  regime	  up	  until	  1998.	  
2	  See	  DAVID	  KOSAŘ,	  PERILS	  OF	  JUDICIAL	  SELF-­‐GOVERNMENT	  IN	  TRANSITIONAL	  SOCIETIES	  (2016),	  254–256.	  
3	   Council	   of	   Europe,	  Committee	   of	  Ministers.	   Recommendation	  No.	   R	   (94)	   12	   of	   the	   Committee	   of	  Ministers	   to	  
member	   states	   on	   the	   independence,	   efficiency	   and	   role	   of	   judges.	   13	   October	   1994,	  
http://www.barobirlik.org.tr/dosyalar/duyurular/hsykkanunteklifi/recR(94)12e.pdf.	  	  
4	   European	   Commission,	   2000	   Regular	   Report	   on	   Slovakia’s	   Progress	   towards	   Accession,	   November	   2000.	   The	  
suggestions	  to	  foster	  the	  introduction	  of	  proper	  judicial	  structures	  reach	  as	  far	  as	  to	  the	  first	  progress	  report	  from	  
1998.	   European	   Commission.	   Progress	   Report	   on	   Slovakia,	   1998,	   https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-­‐
enlargement/sites/near/files/archives/pdf/key_documents/1998/slovakia_en.pdf.	  	  
5	   See	  Michal	   Bobek	   and	   David	   Kosař,	  Global	   Solutions,	   Local	   Damages:	   A	   Critical	   Study	   in	   Judicial	   Councils	   in	  
Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  15	  GERMAN	  L.J.	  1257	  (2015);	  and	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  126–136.	  
6	  As	  Uzelac	  writes,	  “socialist	   legal	  world	  was,	  by	   its	  nature,	  not	   that	  socialist“	  but	  rather	  consisted	  of	  particular	  
practices,	  traditions	  and	  values.	  See	  Alan	  Uzelac,	  Survival	  of	  the	  Third	  Tradition	  377	  (2010)	  49	  SUPREME	  COURT	  L.R.	  
For	   more	   on	   unsuccessful	   de-­‐communization	   of	   the	   Slovak	   judiciary	   see	   also	   Martin	   Kovanič	   &	   Samuel	   Spáč,	  
Vyrovnanie	   sa	   s	   minulosťou	   v	   sudcovskom	   stave,	   in	   NEDOTKUNTEĽNÍ?	   POLITIKA	   SUDCOVSKÝCH	   KARIÉR	   NA	   SLOVENSKU	   V	  
ROKOCH	  1993	  –	  2015	  (Erik	  Láštic	  &	  Samuel	  Spáč,	  eds.,	  2018).	  Turnover	  in	  the	  Czech	  counterpart	  is	  estimated	  to	  be	  
larger,	   see	   Samuel	   Spáč,	   JUDICIARY	   DEVELOPMENT	   AFTER	   THE	   BREAKDOWN	   OF	   COMMUNISM	   IN	   THE	   CZECH	   REPUBLIC	   AND	  
SLOVAKIA	  (MA	  Thesis,	  Central	  European	  University	  2013).	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as	   clear	   cut	   as	   presented	   by	   prevailing	   literature	   addressing	   the	   issue	   of	   judicial	   self-­‐
governance	  (“JSG”).7	  
	  
There	   are	   several	   reasons	   for	   scepticism	   about	   the	   compatibility	   of	   the	   existing	   legal	  
culture	   prevalent	   in	   the	   Slovak	   judiciary	   with	   the	   requirements	   placed	   on	   democratic	  
judicial	   systems.	   Even	   after	   almost	   30	   years	   since	   the	   Velvet	   Revolution,	   there	   are	   still	  
many	  judges	  who	  were	  appointed	  during	  the	  communist	  era.	  Additionally,	  the	  turnover	  in	  
judicial	   ranks	   in	   the	   early	   1990s	   was	   rather	  marginal,	   as	   Slovak	   political	   elites	   refrained	  
from	   enforcing	   the	   Czechoslovak	   Lustration	   Law	   adopted	   in	   1991,8	   hence	   even	   judges	  
appointed	   after	   1989	   were	   socialized	   and	   educated	   in	   a	   system	   deaf	   to	   the	   idea	   of	  
independence	   preventing	   the	   judiciary	   from	   a	   ‘mental’	   transition	   to	   proper	   democratic	  
values.9	  This	  is	  currently	  manifested	  in	  judges	  primarily	  seeing	  their	  roles	  as	  bureaucrats,10	  
which	  affects	  both	  the	  application	  of	  law	  and	  the	  performance	  of	  JSG	  itself.11	  
	  
Despite	  the	  fascinating	  history	  of	  the	  Slovak	  JSG,	  the	  existing	  literature	  on	  this	  topic	  is	  far	  
from	  being	  exhaustive,	  and	  it	  disregards	  the	  wider	  social	  and	  cultural	  background	  in	  which	  
JSG	   interacts	  with	  other	  branches	  of	  power.	   This	   article	   fills	   this	   gap,	   and	   through	  an	   in-­‐
depth	  analysis	  of	  the	  Judicial	  Council	  and	  other	  bodies	  partaking	  in	  judicial	  governance	  in	  
Slovakia	   it	   offers	   new	   insights	   for	   the	   study	   of	   judicial	   self-­‐governance	   and	   its	   impact.	  
Furthermore,	  the	  article	  also	  discusses	  shifts	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  judiciary	  and	  
other	   branches	   of	   government,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   implications	   of	   these	   shifts	   on	   the	   core	  
values	  of	  the	  judiciary:	  independence,	  legitimacy,	  accountability,	  transparency,	  and	  public	  
confidence.	  We	  opt	  for	  a	  holistic	  approach:	  we	  focus	  on	  both	  the	  structural	  setting	  and	  the	  
allocation	  of	  formal	  powers,	  as	  well	  as	  on	  their	  translation	  into	  practice.	  It	  therefore	  brings	  
novel	  and	  important	  findings	  for	  both	  legal	  and	  political	  science	  audiences.	  	  
	  
The	   article	   proceeds	   as	   follows:	   first,	   section	   B	   analyses	   the	   rationales	   of	   judicial	   self-­‐
government	   in	  three	  stages:	  The	  early	  1990s;	  the	   introduction	  of	  a	   judicial	  council	  during	  
the	   accession	   to	   the	   EU	   process;	   and	   post-­‐accession	   development.	   It	   focuses	   on	   the	  
normative	   and	   practical	   changes	   in	   judicial	   independence	   and	   accountability.	   Section	   C	  
incorporates	  a	  more	  sociological	  perspective	  and	  concentrates	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  JSG	  on	  
                                            
7	  For	  more	  see:	  David	  Kosař,	  Beyond	  Judicial	  Councils:	  Forms,	  Rationales	  and	  Impact	  of	  Judicial	  Self-­‐Governance	  in	  
Europe	  (in	  this	  special	  issue).	  
8	  See	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  240–243	  
9	  See	  Kovanič	  &	  Spáč,	  supra	  note	  6,	  at	  37–61.	  	  
10	   See	  Michal	  Bobek,	  The	  Fortress	  of	   Judicial	   Independence	  and	   the	  Mental	  Transitions	  of	   the	  Central	  European	  
Judiciaries	  14	  EUROPEAN	  PUBLIC	  LAW	  99	  (2008).	  
11	  See	  particularly	  András	  Sajó	  and	  Vera	  Losonci,	  Rule	  by	  Law	  in	  East	  Central	  Europe:	  Is	  the	  Emperor’s	  New	  Suit	  a	  
Straightjacket?	   in	   CONSTITUTIONALISM	   AND	  DEMOCRACY:	   TRANSITIONS	   IN	   THE	   CONTEMPORARY	  WORLD	   289	   (D.Greenberg,	  
ed.,	  1993),	  at	  322.	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the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  judiciary,	  on	  its	  transparency	  towards	  individual	  political	  and	  societal	  
actors,	   and	   public	   trust	   and	   confidence	   in	   the	   judiciary.	   Section	   D	   analyses	   shifts	   in	   the	  
political	   system	   and	   the	   relationship	   of	   the	   judiciary	   and	   JSG	   bodies	   towards	   other	  
branches	   of	   power	   from	   the	   separation-­‐of-­‐powers	   perspective.	   Finally,	   Section	   E	  
concludes.	  	  
	  
B.	  The	  Politics	  of	  Judicial	  Independence	  and	  Judicial	  Accountability:	  from	  Ministerial	  
Control	  to	  Self-­‐Governance	  and	  Back?	  
	  
As	  regards	  the	  institutional	  framework	  of	  judicial	  administration,	  development	  in	  Slovakia	  
has	  been	  quite	  turbulent.	  In	  this	  part,	  we	  briefly	  describe	  the	  changes	  in	  this	  area,	  focusing	  
on	  powers	  related	  to	  the	  professional	  careers	  of	  judges.12	  However,	  we	  do	  not	  focus	  solely	  
on	   the	   institutional	   setup	   but	   also	   look	   at	   how	   formal	   powers	   translate	   into	   practice.	   In	  
other	  words,	   in	  this	  chapter	  we	  focus	  predominantly	  on	  the	  de	   jure	   independence	  of	  the	  
judiciary	   –	   referring	   to	   ‘structural	   insulation’	   from	   political	   branches	   –	   and	   de	   facto	  
independence,13	   i.e.	   execution	   of	   these	   formal	   powers	   through	   the	   selection	   of	   judges,	  
their	   promotions,	   or	   accountability	   mechanisms.14	   Additionally,	   we	   discuss	   instances	  
where	   independence,	   understood	   as	   an	   output	   feature	   of	   the	   judicial	   system,	   was	   at	  
stake.15	  Similarly	  to	  independence,	  we	  also	  focus	  on	  multiple	  dimensions	  of	  accountability,	  
comparing	  both	   the	  de	   jure	   and	  de	   facto	   consequences	   that	   the	   judiciary	   and	   individual	  
judges	   may	   face	   in	   connection	   to	   their	   behavior	   at	   the	   hands	   of	   principals	   in	   different	  
branches	  of	  power.16	  	  
                                            
12	  Administrative	  and	  managerial	  powers	  have	  to	  a	  great	  extent	  always	  belonged	  to	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice.	  The	  
Ministry	  decides	  about	  the	  number	  of	  courts,	   judges,	   law	  clerks	  or	  other	  court	  employees,	  as	  well	  as	  about	  the	  
budget	  of	  the	  judicial	  system,	  and	  majority	  of	  technical	  and	  material	  equipment.	  The	  Ministry	  also	  manages	  all	  ICT	  
systems	  used	   by	   the	   courts.	   The	   Supreme	  Court	   is	   an	   exception	   from	   this	   rule	   as	   it	   stands	   as	   an	   independent	  
category	   in	   the	   budget	   approved	   by	   the	   parliament,	   however	   it	   still	   uses	   the	   same	   ICT	   systems,	   although	   it	  
administers	  them	  on	  its	  own.	  	  
13	  Various	  vocabulary	  has	  been	  applied	  to	  this	  dichotomy	  –	  it	  is	  the	  difference	  between	  independence	  understood	  
as	   means	   and	   ends,	   the	   difference	   between	   mechanisms	   and	   values,	   the	   difference	   between	   ‘structural	  
insulation’	  and	  ‘impartiality’,	  or	  the	  difference	  between	  institutional	  and	  decisional	  independence.	  For	  more	  see	  
e.g.:	  Stephen	  B.	  Burbank	  and	  Barry	  Friedman,	  Reconsidering	  Judicial	  Independence	  in	  JUDICIAL	  INDEPENDENCE	  AT	  THE	  
CROSSROADS:	   AN	   INTERDISCIPLINARY	   APPROACH	   9	   (2002),	   at	   9–42;	   or	   Charles	   G.	   Geyh,	   Judicial	   Independence,	   Judicial	  
Accountability,	  and	  the	  role	  of	  Constitutional	  Norms	  in	  Congressional	  Regulation	  of	  the	  Courts,	  78	  INDIANA	  L.J.	  153	  
(2003),	   at	   153–221;	   or	   Shimon	   Shetreet,	   Judicial	   Independence	   and	   accountability:	   core	   values	   in	   liberal	  
democracies	  in	  JUDICIARIES	  IN	  COMPARATIVE	  PERSPECTIVE	  3	  (H.P.Lee,	  ed.,	  2011)	  at	  3–24.	  
14	  Under	  the	  term	  ‘judicial	  accountability’	  we	  include	  both	  decisional	  accountability	  and	  behavioral	  accountability,	  
both	   on-­‐the-­‐bench	   and	   off-­‐the-­‐bench,	   both	   formal	   (e.g.	   disciplinary	   proceedings,	   remuneration)	   and	   informal	  
(changing	  working	  conditions).	  For	  more	  see	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  25–120.	  
15	   See	   for	   instance	   Popova’s	   definition	  which	   holds	   that	   “independent	   judiciary	   delivers	   decisions	   that	   do	   not	  
consistently	   reflect	   preference	   of	   a	   particular	   group	   of	   actors”	   in	  Maria	   Popova,	   POLITICIZED	   JUSTICE	   IN	   EMERGING	  
DEMOCRACIES:	  A	  STUDY	  OF	  COURTS	  IN	  RUSSIA	  AND	  UKRAINE	  (2012).	  
16	  See	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  25–72.	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There	  are	  three	  distinguishable	  periods	  since	  the	  establishment	  of	  independent	  Slovakia	  in	  
1993.	  First,	  during	  Mečiar’s	  government,	  the	  judiciary	  was	  to	  a	   large	  extent	  controlled	  by	  
the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice	  with	  the	  help	  of	  the	  parliament.	   In	  1998,	  when	  Mečiar’s	  party	   lost	  
the	   election	   to	   the	   pro-­‐democratic	   broad	   coalition	   led	   by	  Mikuláš	  Dzurinda,	   establishing	  
Slovakia	  as	  a	  trustworthy	  partner	  for	  western	  democracies	  became	  the	  highest	  priority.	  In	  
this	   period,	   Slovak	  political	   elites	  did	  what	   they	   could	   to	  meet	   the	   criteria	   for	   successful	  
integration,17	   including	  a	   fundamental	   reform	  of	   the	   judicial	   system.	  However,	  as	   judicial	  
elites	   used	   this	   strong	   model	   of	   JSG	   for	   their	   own	   benefit,	   since	   2010	   politicians	   have	  
sought	  a	  new	  arrangement	  for	  the	  administration	  of	  judicial	  careers,	  with	  the	  intention	  to	  
counterbalance	  the	  dominance	  of	  judicial	  actors.	  
	  
I.	  Judiciary	  Under	  Political	  Control	  (1993	  –	  1998)	  
	  
During	  the	  communist	  regime,	  the	  judiciary	  was	  almost	  completely	  controlled	  by	  the	  ruling	  
party	   –	   politicians	   decided	   on	   the	   appointment,	   promotion,	   and	   dismissal	   of	   judges.18	  
Formally,	   the	   power	  was	   dispersed	   between	   the	  Ministers	   of	   Justice,	   parliaments,19	   and	  
court	  presidents,	  and	  these	  actors	  preserved	  the	  power	  even	  after	  the	  revolution.	  Perhaps	  
most	  importantly,	  judges	  did	  not	  have	  life	  tenure	  and	  their	  terms	  in	  office	  rested	  to	  a	  large	  
extent	   in	   the	  hands	  of	  politicians.	  Czechoslovak	  parliament	  addressed	   this	   issue	   in	  1991,	  
and	  thereafter	  judges	  could	  be	  removed	  from	  office	  only	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  disciplinary	  senate	  
decision.	  Otherwise,	  the	  Ministry	  remained	  largely	  in	  charge.	  	  
	  
Slovakia	  inherited	  this	  framework,	  however	  the	  1992	  Constitution	  re-­‐introduced	  limited	  4-­‐
year	   terms	   for	   newly	   appointed	   judges,	   while	   they	   were	   appointed	   by	   the	   parliament	  
(National	  Council	  of	  the	  Slovak	  Republic,	  “NCSR”)	  upon	  the	  nomination	  of	  the	  Minister	  of	  
Justice.	   If	   judges	   were	   re-­‐elected	   after	   the	   4-­‐year	   probation	   period,	   they	   enjoyed	   life	  
tenure.	   The	   European	   Commission	   repeatedly	   criticized	   this	   provision	   for	   the	   excessive	  
control	   vested	   into	   the	  hands	  of	  political	  branches.20	  The	  European	  Commission	  stressed	  
                                            
17	  See	  e.g.	  European	  Commission.	  Progress	  report	  on	  Slovakia	  1999,	  p.14.	  https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-­‐
enlargement/sites/near/files/archives/pdf/key_documents/1999/slovakia_en.pdf.	   Or	   European	   Commission,	  
2001	   Regular	   Report	   on	   Slovakia’s	   progress	   towards	   accession,	   SEC	   (20010	   1475,	   13	   November	   2001,	  
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-­‐enlargement/sites/near/files/archives/pdf/key_documents/2001/sk_en.pdf	  
18	  See	  e.g.	  Zdeněk	  Kühn,	  Socialistická	  Justice,	  In	  KOMUNISTICKÉ	  PRÁVO	  (Michal	  Bobek,	  Pavel	  Molek	  &	  Vojtěch	  Šimíček,	  
eds.,	   2009);	   Hakeem	   O.	   Yusuf,	   Calling	   the	   Judiciary	   to	   Account	   for	   the	   Past:	   Transitional	   Justice	   and	   Judicial	  
Accountability	   in	   Nigeria.	   30	   LAW	  &	   POLICY	   194	   (2008);	   DAVID	   DYZENHAUS,	   JUDGING	   THE	   JUDGES,	   JUDGING	  OURSELVES:	  
TRUTH,	  RECONCILIATION	  AND	  THE	  APARTHEID	  LEGAL	  ORDER	  (2003).	  
19	  We	  use	  plural	  here	  as	  Czechoslovakia	  was	  a	  federal	  state.	  Additionally,	  judges	  at	  the	  lowest	  level	  were	  elected	  
by	  political	  representatives	  at	  the	  local	  level.	  See	  Kühn,	  supra	  note	  18.	  
20	  The	  critique	  also	  addressed	  substantive	  execution	  of	  the	  powers.	  In	  1997,	  the	  government	  refused	  to	  nominate	  
12	  judges	  for	  re-­‐election	  without	  any	  reasoning.	  See	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  256.	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the	   need	   for	   and	   establishment	   of	   a	   judicial	   council	   to	   foster	   the	   independence	   of	   the	  
judiciary	  from	  politicians.21	  	  
	  
Another	  problematic	  aspect	  of	   the	  Slovak	  system	  was	  the	  strong	  position	  of	   the	  Ministry	  
towards	   court	   presidents,	   as	   it	  was	   the	  Minister	  who	  appointed	   and	   could	  dismiss	   court	  
presidents	  practically	  at	  will,22	  and	  once	  again,	  he	  did	  not	  hesitate	  to	  use	  this	  power.23	  The	  
influence	  that	  political	  branches	  exercised	  over	  court	  presidents	  was	  another	  major	  tool	  of	  
political	   control	   over	   the	   judiciary.	   First	   of	   all,	   during	   the	   communist	   regime,	   court	  
presidents	   served	   as	   ‘transmission	   belts’	   for	   political	   elites	   towards	   the	   judicial	   system,	  
hence	   there	   was	   a	   good	   chance	   this	   practice	   survived	   in	   the	   first	   decade	   after	   the	  
breakdown	  of	  the	  previous	  regime.24	  Court	  presidents	  controlled	  the	  assignment	  of	  cases,	  
appointments	  of	  chamber	  presidents	  or	  their	  reassignments	  within	  courts	  and	  in	  this	  way	  
they	   could	   secure	   desirable	   outcomes	   in	   their	   respective	   courts.	   Additionally,	   they	   also	  
held	   crucial	   powers	   regarding	   the	   accountability	   of	   judges	   –	   they	   initiated	   disciplinary	  
proceedings,	  and	  together	  with	  the	  Ministry	  decided	  on	  promotions	  and	  secondments	  of	  
judges.25	  	  
	  
In	   this	   period,	   there	   was	   no	   evidence	   of	   these	   powers	   being	   used	   either	   for	   rewarding	  
allies	  or	  punishing	   critics	  of	   judicial	  or	  political	  elites.26	   This	   fact	   is	   interesting	   for	   several	  
reasons,	   especially	   considering	   the	   tense	   relationship	   between	   the	   government	   and	  
judges.27	   The	   largest	   judicial	   association,	   the	   Association	   of	   Judges	   of	   Slovakia,	   was	  
occasionally	  very	  critical	  of	  the	  government	  or	  of	  the	  judges	  who	  publicly	  supported	  some	  
of	  government’s	  causes.	  First,	  it	  may	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  government	  did	  not	  need	  to	  resort	  
to	  these	  tools,	  as	  they	  exercised	  sufficient	  control	  over	  the	  judiciary	  through	  appointments	  
and	   some	   managerial	   measures	   –	   e.g.	   the	   considerable	   salary	   hike	   in	   the	   mid-­‐1990s.	  
                                            
21	  See	  for	  instance	  European	  Commission,	  Agenda	  2000,	  Progress	  report	  1998,	  Monitoring	  reports	  1999-­‐2000.	  
22	  The	  process	  was	  a	  little	  more	  complicated	  regarding	  the	  position	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  who	  
was	   elected	   by	   the	   parliament,	   but	   the	   parliament	   could	   not	   dismiss	   him.	   However,	   when	   in	   1997	   the	   Chief	  
Justice	  Milan	  Karabin	   resigned	   from	   this	  position	   to	  be	   replaced	  by	  Štefan	  Harabin,	  a	  judge	  much	  more	  closely	  
associated	  with	   government	   parties,	   it	   officially	   happened	   for	   health-­‐related	   reasons,	   yet	   Karabin	   shortly	   after	  
that	  continued	  in	  his	  judicial	  career	  and	  eventually	  became	  Chief	  Justice	  again	  in	  2003.	  See	  David	  Kosař	  &	  Samuel	  
Spáč,	   Predsedovia	   súdov:	   Od	   ministerských	   “spojok”	   k	   autonómnym	   aktérom,	   in	   NEDOTKUNTEĽNÍ?	   POLITIKA	  
SUDCOVSKÝCH	  KARIÉR	  NA	  SLOVENSKU	  V	  ROKOCH	  1993	  –	  2015	  (Erik	  Láštic	  &	  Samuel	  Spáč,	  eds.,	  Univerzita	  Komenského,	  
2018).	  	  
23	  See	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  256.	  
24	  See	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  49.	  
25	  See	  Bobek	  &	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  5.	  
26	  See	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  338–339.	  
27	  Minister	  of	   Justice	   Jozef	   Liščák	  even	   referred	   to	   some	   judges	  as	   “buggers	   and	   frats	   stupid	  as	   cues.”	   See	   See	  
Kosař,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  255.	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Second,	   refraining	   from	  a	  more	   fundamental	  use	  of	   judicial	  accountability	  measures	  may	  
indicate	   either	   the	   government’s	   ambition	   –	   possibly	   a	   very	   weak	   one	   –	   to	   become	   a	  
standard	   democratic	   country,	   or	   a	   lack	   of	   courage	   to	   strongly	   oppose	   democratic	   forces	  
within	  the	  society.	  Despite	  its	  nationalistic	  rhetoric	  and	  use	  of	  authoritative	  methods,	  the	  
government,	   in	   1995,	   partially	   submitted	   to	   the	   European	   Commission’s	   calls	   for	   more	  
autonomy	   of	   the	   judicial	   branch	   by	   establishing	   judicial	   boards	   at	   the	   Supreme	   and	  
regional	   courts,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   Council	   of	   Judges	   of	   the	   Slovak	   Republic.28	   Nevertheless,	  
although	  this	  institution	  represented	  the	  JSG,	  it	  was	  vested	  only	  with	  consultative	  powers,	  
which	  the	  government	  did	  not	  use	  in	  practice.29	  Yet,	  it	  deserves	  to	  be	  stressed	  that	  judges	  
who	  criticized	  the	  government	  did	  not	  face	  any	  extraordinary	  repercussions.	  For	  some	  of	  
them,	  especially	  those	  representing	  the	  Association	  of	  Judges	  of	  Slovakia,	  hard	  times	  came	  
about	  a	  decade	  later.30	  
	  
II.	  Empowering	  Judges:	  From	  Euro-­‐Optimism	  to	  Disillusion	  (1998	  –	  2010)	  
	  
1.	  Euro-­‐Model	  of	  Judicial	  Self-­‐Governance:	  Changes,	  Rationales,	  and	  Powers	  
	  
Parliamentary	  elections	  in	  1998	  marked	  an	  important	  milestone	  in	  the	  history	  of	  Slovakia.31	  
The	  parties	  of	  Mečiar’s	  government	  were	  replaced	  by	  a	  broad	  pro-­‐democratic	  coalition	  led	  
by	  Mikuláš	  Dzurinda.	  The	  main	  goal	  of	   this	  was	  to	  catch	  up	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Visegrad	  
group	  and	  make	  the	  country	  acceptable	  to	  Western	  democracies.	  It	  was	  an	  era	  of	  almost	  
unconditional	  Euro-­‐optimism,	  accompanied	  by	  numerous	  reforms,	  including	  the	  reform	  of	  
judicial	  administration.	  First,	  a	  new	  Law	  on	  Judges	  was	  passed	  in	  2000,	  securing	  life	  tenure	  
for	   judges,	   eliminating	  probation	  periods,	   and	   transferring	   the	   appointment	   competence	  
from	  the	  parliament	  to	  the	  President,	  who	  acted	  upon	  the	  nomination	  by	  the	  Minister	  of	  
Justice.	  A	  further	  move	  towards	  the	  ‘Euro-­‐model’32	  of	  judicial	  administration	  took	  place	  in	  
2001	   when	   a	   Constitutional	   amendment	   established	   the	   Judicial	   Council	   of	   the	   Slovak	  
Republic	  (JCSR),33	  and	  the	  Act	  on	  the	  JCSR	  passed	  in	  the	  parliament	  the	  following	  year.34	  In	  
                                            
28	  See	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  255.	  
29	   In	   1997,	   when	   the	   parliament,	   upon	   nomination	   by	   the	   Minister,	   elected	   Štefan	   Harabin	   to	   become	   Chief	  
Justice	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Court,	   neither	   the	   judicial	   board	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   nor	   the	   Council	   favored	   the	  
appointment.	  For	  more	  see	  Kosař	  &	  Spáč,	  supra	  note	  22.	  
30	  See	  the	  following	  Section.	  
31	  See	  Bunce	  &	  Wolchik,	  supra	  note	  1.	  
32	  See	  Bobek	  &	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  5;	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  126–136.	  
33	  The	  amendment	  included	  a	  larger	  bulk	  of	  reforms	  concerning	  the	  Constitutional	  Court,	  preparing	  the	  ground	  for	  
Slovak	  accession	  to	   the	  EU,	  creation	  of	   the	  Supreme	  Audit	  Office	  of	   the	  Slovak	  Republic	  and	  reforms	  regarding	  
regional	  self-­‐government.	  
34	  Act	  No.	  185/2002	  on	  the	  Judicial	  Council	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addition,	   the	   Judicial	   Academy	   of	   the	   Slovak	   Republic	   was	   established	   in	   2003	   as	   an	  
institution	  fostering	  the	  independent	  education	  of	  judges.35	  
	  
The	   explanatory	   memorandum	   for	   the	   amendment	   establishing	   the	   JCSR	   was	   at	   times	  
rather	  vague,	  referring	  only	  to	  the	  increase	  of	  the	  quality	  of	  democracy,	  strengthening	  the	  
independence	   and	   autonomy	   of	   the	   judiciary,	   and	   ‘an	   honest	   interest	   to	   become	   a	  
member	   of	   the	   family	   of	   European	   states’.	   However,	   parts	   of	   the	   explanatory	  
memorandum	  specify	   that	   the	  reform	  was	   inspired	  by	  several	   international	  documents	  –	  
namely,	  UN	  Basic	  Principles	  on	  the	  Independence	  of	  the	  Judiciary,	  Recommendation	  R	  (94)	  
12	  of	  the	  Committee	  of	  Ministers	  on	  the	  Independence,	  Efficiency	  and	  Role	  of	  Judges,	  as	  
well	  as	  by	  the	  European	  Charter	  on	  the	  Statute	  of	  Judges,	  and	  is	  a	  response	  to	  the	  critique	  
from	   observers	   in	   the	   accession	   process.36	   The	   main	   arguments	   heard	   in	   the	   debate	   in	  
favor	  of	  the	  proposal	  posited	  that	  the	  amendment	  was	  necessary	  if	  Slovakia	  wanted	  to	  be	  
a	   member	   of	   the	   European	   Union,37	   but	   the	   general	   tone	   simply	   suggested	   that	   the	  
coalition	  perceived	   the	   adoption	  of	   the	  Council	  model	   as	   the	   ‘right	   solution’,	   and	   that	   it	  
should	   secure	   independence,	   protect	   the	   judiciary	   from	   the	   capriciousness	   of	   political	  
elites,	  and	  even	   improve	  the	  unsatisfactory	  performance	  of	  the	   judicial	  system.38	  Despite	  
the	  discussion	   in	  the	  parliament,	  many	  argue	  that	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  JCSR	  was	  mostly	  a	  
stance	   against	   ‘mečiarism’	   –	   an	   autocratic	   style	   of	   government	   represented	   by	   former	  
Prime	  Minister	  Vladimír	  Mečiar	  –	  and	  the	  EU	  argument	  was	  used	  to	  simply	  legitimize	  this	  
process.39	  
	  
Originally,	   the	   JCSR	   consisted	   of	   eight	   judges	   elected	   by	   their	   peers,	   three	   members	  
elected	   by	   the	   parliament,	   three	   members	   appointed	   by	   the	   government,	   and	   three	  
members	  appointed	  by	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Slovak	  Republic,	  all	  serving	  a	  maximum	  of	  two	  
consecutive	   five-­‐year	   terms.	   The	   last	   member	   of	   the	   JCSR	   was	   its	   president,	   who	   was	  
elected	  by	   the	  other	  members	  of	   the	   JCSR	  out	  of	   the	   judges	  of	   the	   Supreme	  Court,	   and	  
                                            
35	  The	   idea	   for	  such	  an	   institution	  had	  been	  promoted	  by	   the	  Association	  of	   Judges	  of	  Slovakia	  since	  1995,	  but	  
successfully	  started	  its	  operation	  only	  in	  September	  2004.	  The	  Academy	  is	  governed	  by	  a	  ten-­‐member	  Board:	  five	  
nominated	   by	   the	   JCSR	   from	   all	   judges,	   five	   nominated	   by	   the	   Minister	   of	   Justice,	   two	   of	   them	   upon	   the	  
suggestion	  of	   the	  General	   Prosecutor.	  Until	   2009,	   at	   least	   two	  members	  nominated	  by	   the	  Minister	  had	   to	  be	  
judges,	  thus	  securing	  a	  clear	  majority	  for	  judicial	  actors.	  	  
36	  See	  Spáč,	  supra	  note	  6.	  
37	  See	  Spáč,	  supra	  note	  6,	  at	  60–64.	  
38	  	  	  See	  Alexander	  Bröstl,	  At	  the	  Crossroads	  on	  the	  Way	  to	  an	  Independent	  Slovak	  Judiciary	  in	  SYSTEMS	  OF	  JUSTICE	  IN	  
TRANSITION:	  CENTRAL	  AND	  EASTERN	  EUROPEAN	  EXPERIENCES	  SINCE	  1989	  (Jiři	  Přibáň,	  Pauline	  Roberts	  &	  James	  Young,	  eds.,	  
2003);	  or	  Pavol	  Rohárik,	  The	  Judiciary	  and	  Its	  Transition	  in	  Slovakia	  after	  1989	   in	  SYSTEMS	  OF	  JUSTICE	  IN	  TRANSITION:	  
CENTRAL	  AND	  EASTERN	  EUROPEAN	  EXPERIENCES	  SINCE	  1989	  (Jiři	  Přibáň,	  Pauline	  Roberts	  &	  James	  Young,	  eds.,	  2003).	  
39	  See	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  2;	  and	  Ján	  Svák,	  Slovenská	  skúsenosť	  s	  optimalizáciou	  modelu	  správy	  súdnictva	  in	  HLEDÁNÍ	  
OPTIMÁLNEHO	  MODELU	   SPRÁVY	   SOUDNICTVÍ	   PRO	  ČESKOU	  REPUBLIKU	   (J.Kysela,	  ed.,	  2008);	   and	  Tim	  Haughton,	  Exit	  Choice	  
and	  Legacy:	  Explaining	  Patterns	  of	  Party	  Politics	  in	  Post-­‐communist	  Slovakia“30	  EAST	  EUROPEAN	  POLITICS	  210	  (2014).	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who	   at	   the	   same	   time	   served	   as	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Court.	   This	   person	  
therefore	   enjoyed	   the	   dual	   role	   of	   being	   a	   very	   strong	   actor	  within	   the	   Supreme	   Court,	  
while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   having	   the	   power	   to	   oversee	   and	   influence	   practically	   all	  major	  
decisions	   in	   the	   judicial	   system.	   The	   logic	   behind	   the	   composition	   was	   to	   secure	   parity	  
between	   judicial	  and	  non-­‐judicial	  members.	  Nine	   judges	  were	  supposed	  to	  represent	   the	  
Supreme	  Court	  and	  the	  eight	  regional	  circuits	  of	  the	  Slovak	  judiciary,40	  the	  remaining	  nine	  
members,	   nominated	   by	   political	   branches,	   were	   supposed	   to	   ensure	   the	   balance	   of	  
interests	  between	  judges	  and	  politicians.	  	  
	  
However,	   as	   neither	   the	   Constitution	   nor	   the	   Law	   specified	   that	   nominees	   of	   political	  
branches	  shall	  not	  be	  judges,41	  in	  the	  JCSR’s	  15	  years	  of	  existence,	  judges	  have	  always	  had	  
a	  clear	  majority.42	  This	  fact	  should	  not	  be	  too	  surprising.	  Since	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  JCSR,	  
the	   government,	   parliamentary	   majority,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   office	   of	   the	   President	  
predominantly	  belonged	  to	  politicians	  who	  opposed	  the	  adopted	  composition	  of	  this	  body.	  
The	   only	   competing	   proposal	   in	   the	   parliamentary	   debate	   was	   presented	   by	   Štefan	  
Harabin,	  at	  that	  time	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  who	  argued	  for	  a	  composition	  
with	  ten	  judges	  and	  six	  nominees	  from	  the	  Parliament.	  Harabin	  later	  served	  as	  the	  Minister	  
of	  Justice	  (2006-­‐2009),	  and	  during	  his	  term	  appointed	  only	  judges.	  Harabin’s	  proposal	  was	  
backed	   mainly	   by	   the	   opposition	   MPs,	   including	   Ivan	   Gašparovič,	   who	   served	   as	   the	  
President	   of	   Slovakia	   between	  2004	   and	   2014,	  who	   filled	   three	  out	   of	   six	   positions	  with	  
judges	   during	   his	   term.	   Additionally,	   the	   proposal	   was	   backed	   by	   –	   at	   that	   time	   –	  
independent	  MP	   Robert	   Fico,	   who	   later	   became	   the	   Prime	  Minister,	   serving	   from	   2006	  
until	  14	  March	  2018,	  with	  a	  21-­‐month	  intermission	  between	  2010	  and	  2012.	  
	  
	  
2.	  Judicial	  Self-­‐Governance	  in	  Practice:	  Misusing	  Vested	  Powers	  for	  the	  Benefit	  of	  the	  
Judicial	  Elite	  
	  
The	  role	  the	  JCSR	  is	  supposed	  to	  play	  in	  the	  political	  system	  has	  never	  been	  clear.	  Most	  of	  
its	  powers	  are	  related	  to	  the	  professional	  careers	  of	  judges,	  and	  our	  calculation	  shows	  that	  
as	  much	  as	  63%	  of	  almost	  3,200	  resolutions	  adopted	  by	  the	  JCSR	  between	  2002	  and	  May	  
2017	   addressed	   personalmatters.	   The	   JCSR	   has	   since	   its	   establishment	   been	   a	   powerful	  
actor	   in	   the	   appointment,	   promotion,	   and	   secondment	   of	   judges,	   and	  with	   considerable	  
powers	  in	  disciplining	  as	  well	  as	  dismissing	  judges	  due	  to	  their	  age;	  although	  the	  actual	  act	  
                                            
40	  See	  Svák,	  supra	  note	  39.	  
41	  	  	  The	  explanatory	  note	  actually	  included	  the	  expectation	  that	  political	  branches	  will	  nominate	  experts	  in	  law	  or	  
representatives	  of	  other	  legal	  professions.	  
42	  Between	  2002	  and	  2007	  there	  were	  twelve	  judges	  to	  six	  non-­‐judges	  at	  the	  JCSR.	  Between	  2007	  and	  2012,	  the	  
ratio	   shifted	   to	   sixteen	   judges	   to	   two-­‐non-­‐judges.	   Since	   then,	   there	   have	   always	   been	   at	   least	   thirteen	   judges	  
among	  the	  members	  of	  the	  JCSR.	  All	  in	  all,	  political	  branches	  have	  so	  far	  nominated	  40	  members	  to	  the	  JCSR,	  20	  
of	  whom	  were	  judges.	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of	  dismissal	  must	  be	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  President,	  the	  nomination	  by	  the	  JCSR	  is	  necessary.	  
However,	   what	   is	   not	   clear	   is	   whether	   the	   JCSR	   holds	   a	   gatekeeper	   position	   –	   i.e.	   an	  
institution	   with	   final	   say	   in	   these	   matters	   –	   or	   if	   it	   is	   an	   intermediary	   that	   legitimizes	  
decisions	   made	   elsewhere.	   Up	   until	   2011,	   district	   courts	   could	   select	   new	   judges	   from	  
among	   the	   so-­‐called	   judicial	   candidates	   (justiční	   čakatelia)	   serving	   the	   court.43	   The	   JCSR	  
only	   formally	   confirmed	   their	   nominations	   by	   forwarding	   them	   to	   the	   President	   for	  
appointment.	   Similarly,	   individual	   court	   presidents	   also	   dealt	   with	   promotions	   and	  
secondments,	  and	   the	   JCSR	  only	   ‘rubber	   stamped’	   their	  agreements.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	  
the	   JCSR	   has	   always	   decided	   about	   the	   composition	   and	   work	   schedule	   of	   disciplinary	  
senates.44	  	  
	  
Despite	   the	   existence	   of	   the	   JCSR,	   powers	   regarding	   the	   professional	   careers	   of	   judges	  
were	   dispersed	   among	   several	   actors	   within	   the	   judicial	   system,	   with	   only	   very	   few	  
effective	   checks	   and	   balances	   held	   by	   the	   political	   branches.	   For	   instance,	   although	   the	  
character	   of	   the	   court	   presidents’	   involvement	   was	   considerably	   different	   from	   the	  
communist	  era	  and	  the	  1990s,	  they	  still	  remained	  very	  powerful.	  They	  had	  a	  huge	  informal	  
impact	   on	   any	   development	   in	   the	   judicial	   system,	   but	   also	   enjoyed	   a	   significant	   say	   in	  
disciplinary	  proceedings,	  as	  they	  had	  the	  power	  to	  initiate	  them	  and	  exercised	  this	  power	  
frequently.45	   This	   unbalanced	   setup,	   based	  on	   the	   illusion	   that	   judges	  were	   guardians	  of	  
merit-­‐based	  decision	  making	  who	  would	  protect	  the	  judiciary	  from	  undue	  pressure,	  started	  
to	  crumble	  shortly	  after	  Slovak	  accession	  to	  the	  EU	  in	  2004.	  
	  
After	   the	   parliamentary	   elections	   in	   2006,	   the	   rightist	   pro-­‐European	   government	   was	  
replaced	   by	   a	   leftist-­‐nationalist	   government	   led	   by	   Robert	   Fico,	   who	   created	   a	  
controversial	  coalition	  with	  two	  parties	  from	  Mečiar’s	  1994-­‐1998	  government	  –	  the	  Slovak	  
National	   Party	   (SNS),	   and	  Mečiar’s	   own	  Movement	   for	   Democratic	   Slovakia	   (HZDS).	   The	  
government	   appointed	   Štefan	   Harabin	   as	   the	  Minister	   of	   Justice.	   Elected	   in	   1997	   under	  
                                            
43	   This	   issue	   was	   influenced	   by	   political	   conflict	   regarding	   the	   status	   of	   ‘judicial	   candidates.’	   Centre-­‐right	  
governments	   preferred	   open	   selection	   procedures,	   leftist	   and	   nationalistic	   parties	   favored	   ‘judicial	   candidates’	  
trained	  and	  socialized	  within	  the	  system.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  even	  before	  2011	  when	  selection	  procedures	  became	  
obligatory,	   judges	  were	  commonly	  selected	   in	  competitive	  procedures	  as	  positions	  of	   ‘judicial	  candidates’	  were	  
often	   left	   vacant	   by	   the	  decision	  of	   the	  Minister	   of	   Justice.	   This	  was	   changed	   in	   2008	  by	   the	   leftist-­‐nationalist	  
government	   represented	   by	   Minister	   Štefan	   Harabin,	   who	   enacted	   into	   law	   the	   preference	   for	   ‘judicial	  
candidates.’	   For	  more	   see:	   Juraj	   Palúš,	  Právna	  úprava	   výberu	   sudcov	  na	   Slovensku	   in	   PRÍSTUP	   K	   SPRAVODLIVOSTI	   –	  
BARIÉRY	  A	  VÝCHODISKÁ:	  VÝBER	  SUDCOV	  (Kristína	  Babiaková,	  ed.,	  2015).	  
44	  There	  are	  two	  types	  of	  disciplinary	  senates.	  In	  the	  first	  instance,	  the	  senate	  consists	  of	  three	  members	  elected	  
by	  the	  JCSR	  upon	  nomination	  by	  judicial	  boards,	  the	  parliament	  and	  the	  Minister.	  In	  the	  second	  instance,	  senates	  
have	   five	  members,	  one	  nominated	  by	   judicial	  boards,	  and	   two	  nominated	  by	   the	  parliament	  and	   the	  Minister	  
each.	   Until	   2012	   there	   was	   no	   requirement	   to	   include	   any	   non-­‐judges	   in	   the	   senates,	   hence	   disciplinary	  
procedures	  were	  clearly	  dominated	  by	  judicial	  actors.	  
45	  See	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  299–332.	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Mečiar’s	   government,	   he	   was	   the	   former	   Chief	   Justice	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   and	   had	  
managed	  to	  polarize	  the	  judicial	  system	  during	  his	  term	  in	  office.46	  	  
	  
As	  Minister,	  Harabin	  was	  not	  reluctant	  to	  utilize	  his	  powers.	  One	  measure	  that	   increased	  
his	   popularity	   in	   the	   judicial	   ranks	  was	   the	   re-­‐establishment	   of	   ‘judicial	   candidates’	   as	   a	  
preferred	  way	  of	   filling	   vacant	   judicial	  positions.	   This	  was	   largely	  appreciated	  among	   the	  
judges,	  as	  it	  gave	  courts	  –	  and	  its	  presidents	  and	  judicial	  boards	  –	  much	  more	  control	  over	  
the	  selection	  of	  their	  new	  colleagues.	   In	  2012,	  as	  many	  as	  one	   in	  five	   judges	  had	  at	   least	  
one	  family	  member	  working	  in	  the	  judiciary.47	  He	  also	  vastly	  and	  purposefully	  utilized	  the	  
power	   to	   appoint	   court	   presidents	   when	   during	   his	   term	   31	   out	   of	   54	   district	   court	  
presidents	   changed,	   as	  well	   as	   4	   out	   of	   8	   presidents	   of	   regional	   courts,	   hence	   changing	  
altogether	  56%	  of	  presidents	  of	  district	  and	  regional	  courts.48	  Apparently,	  appointment	  of	  
court	   presidents	   remained	   of	   interest	   for	   ministers,	   even	   though	   their	   powers	   became	  
much	  more	   limited.49	  Additionally,	   three	  of	   these	  new	  court	  presidents	  were	  at	   the	   time	  
members	   of	   the	   JCSR,	   two	   elected	   by	   judges,	   one	   nominated	   to	   the	   JCSR	   by	   Harabin	  
himself.	  Also,	  Harabin	  used	  his	  power	  to	  temporarily	  assign	  judges	  from	  different	  courts	  to	  
the	   Ministry	   of	   Justice	   where	   they	   participated	   in	   the	   preparation	   of	   judicial	   policies,	  
supporting	  some	  judges’	  perceptions	  that	  Harabin	  was	  a	  champion	  of	  judges’	  interests.	  In	  
the	   same	   fashion,	   Harabin	   also	   chose	   a	   judge,	   Daniel	   Hudák,	   as	   his	   Deputy	   Minister.	  	  
Hudák,	  who	  was	  simultaneously	  Harabin’s	  nominee	   to	   the	   JCSR,	  was	   thus	  both	  an	  active	  
representative	  of	  the	  government	  and	  a	  member	  of	  the	  judiciary.	  
	  
In	  2009,	  while	   still	   serving	  as	  Minister,	   Štefan	  Harabin	  was	  elected	  Chairman	  of	   the	   JCSR	  
and	  Chief	   Justice	  of	   the	  Supreme	  Court,	   in	  part	  by	   those	  who	  were	  either	  nominated	  by	  
him	  to	  the	  JCSR,	  or	  by	  those	  whom	  he	  had	  promoted	  in	  some	  other	  way.50	  Even	  though	  the	  
                                            
46	  For	  more	  about	  Harabin	  see	  Kosaŕ,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  248–254.	  
47	   Gabreil	   Šipoš,	   Samuel	   Spáč	   &	   Peter	   Klátik.	   Kto	   je	   s	   kým	   rodina	   na	   našich	   súdoch;	   available	   at:	  
https://transparency.blog.sme.sk/c/342665/Kto-­‐je-­‐s-­‐kym-­‐rodina-­‐na-­‐nasich-­‐sudoch.html	  
48	  Although	  previous	  ministers	  used	   this	  power	  as	  well,	   none	  of	   them	  had	  done	   so	   to	  a	   comparable	  degree	  as	  
Harabin.	   Available	   data	   show	   that	   Minister	   Ján	   Čarnogurský	   (1998	   –	   2002)	   changed	   altogether	   33%	   of	   court	  
presidents,	  Daniel	  Lipšic	  (2002	  –	  2006)	  changed	  26%	  of	  court	  presidents,	  and	  Lucia	  Žitňanská	  (2006)	  changed	  7%	  
of	  court	  presidents.	  Once	  Harabin	  left	  the	  office	  this	  practice	  became	  much	  more	  common.	  Since	  2010	  there	  have	  
been	  two	  governments	  with	  two	  Ministers	  of	  Justice;	  both	  of	  them	  changed	  about	  50%	  of	  court	  presidents.	  For	  
more	   see	   Kosař	   &	   Spáč,	   supra	   note	   22.	   Among	   court	   presidents	  who	  were	   dismissed	   by	   Harabin	  was	   Ľudovít	  
Bradáč	   from	   the	   regional	   court	   in	   Banská	   Bystrica,	   who	   was	   one	   of	   most	   notable	   representatives	   of	   the	  
Association	  of	  Judges	  of	  Slovakia,	  which	  was	  very	  critical	  of	  Mečiar’s	  government	  during	  1990s.	  
49	  Most	   notably,	   in	   2002,	   court	   presidents	   lost	   their	   power	   to	   assign	   cases	   to	   judges	   due	   to	   the	   adoption	  of	   a	  
system	   of	   computerized	   random	   assignment.	   See	   Katarína	   Staroňová,	   Projekt	   ‚Súdny	   manažment‘	   ako	  
protikorupčný	   nástroj	   in	   JEDENÁSŤ	   STATOČNÝCH:	   PRÍPADOVÉ	   ŠTÚDIE	   PROTIKORUPČNÝCH	   NÁSTROJOV	   NA	   SLOVENSKU	   (Emília	  
Sičáková	  Beblavá	  &	  Miroslav	  Beblavý,	  eds.	  2008).	  
50	  For	  more	  see	  Kosař	  &	  Spáč,	  supra	  note	  22.	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mechanisms	  of	   judicial	   accountability	  have	  produced	  outcomes	   that	   could	  be	   labelled	  as	  
‘accountability	   perversions’	   since	   1993	   –	   mainly	   accountability	   avoidance,	   simulating	  
judicial	  accountability	  or	  selective	  accountability	  –	  51	  the	  situation	  worsened	  once	  Harabin	  
acquired	  the	  powers	  of	  this	  dual	  role.	  Most	  prominently,	  Harabin,	  with	  the	  support	  of	  his	  
allies,	   used	   his	   influence	   to	   punish	   his	   critics	   through	   disciplinary	   procedures.	   At	   least	  
fifteen	  judges	  were	  subjected	  to	  disciplinary	  procedures	  that	  resembled	  bullying52	  or	  have	  
been	  described	  as	  an	  ‘output	  perversion	  of	  judicial	  accountability.’53	  	  
	  
One	  common	  strategy	  was	  to	  initiate	  accountability	  procedures	  against	  recalcitrant	  judges,	  
often	  for	  conduct	  which	  could	  have	  been	  easily	  found	  in	  the	  work	  of	  his	  loyal	  supporters,	  
who	  either	  never	   faced	  any	  disciplinary	  measures	  or	  got	  off	  with	  minor	  sanctions.54	   Juraj	  
Majchrák	  was	   one	   of	   the	   judges	  who	  was	   targeted	   by	   these	   disciplinary	   procedures.	   He	  
was	   a	   Supreme	  Court	   Judge	   known	   for	   his	   critique	   of	   Štefan	  Harabin55	   and	   a	   prominent	  
representative	   of	   the	   Association	   of	   the	   Judges	   of	   Slovakia	   during	   the	   1990s.	   He	   also	  
played	   an	   important	   role	   in	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   JCSR.	  Majchrák	   was	   subjected	   to	   three	  
disciplinary	   proceedings56	   for	   delays,	   which	   are	   very	   common	   in	   court	   operations	   in	  
Slovakia.	   As	   Slovakia	   ranks	   among	   the	   least	   efficient	   judicial	   systems	   in	   the	   EU57	   some	  
delays	  in	  proceedings	  can	  most	  likely	  be	  found	  in	  the	  work	  of	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  judges,	  
suggesting	  that	  this	  disciplinary	  motion	  selectively	  targeted	  Majchrák	  for	  openly	  criticizing	  
Harabin.	  	  
	  
Disciplinary	   motions	   were	   not	   the	   only	   accountability	   mechanism	   widely	   used	   for	   the	  
benefit	   of	   those	   in	   power	   in	   the	   judiciary.	   First,	   as	   Chief	   Justice,	   Štefan	  Harabin	   had	   the	  
power	  to	  award	  salary	  bonuses	  to	  Supreme	  Court	  judges.	  Especially	  in	  2009,	  these	  reached	  
astronomic	   numbers,	   when	   four	   judges,	   all	   members	   of	   the	   JCSR,	   received	   bonuses	   of	  
between	   50,000	   and	   70,000	   euros,	   which	   effectively	   more	   than	   doubled	   their	   annual	  
                                            
51	   See	   Kosaŕ,	   supra	   note	   2,	   at	   68-­‐72	   and	   264-­‐332;	   or	   Pavol	   Žilinčík	   &	   Samuel	   Spáč,	   Selektívna	   zúčtovateľnosť:	  
Príklady	  z	  disciplinárneho	  súdnictva,	   in	  NEDOTKUNTEĽNÍ?	  POLITIKA	  SUDCOVSKÝCH	  KARIÉR	  NA	  SLOVENSKU	  V	  ROKOCH	  1993	  –	  
2015	  (Erik	  Láštic	  &	  Samuel	  Spáč,	  eds.,	  Univerzita	  Komenského	  2018).	  	  
52	  See	  LUKASZ	  BOJARSKI	  &	  WERNER	  STEMKER	  KÖSTER,	  THE	  SLOVAK	  JUDICIARY:	  ITS	  CURRENT	  STATE	  AND	  CHALLENGES	  (2012).	  	  
53	  See	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  68–72.	  
54	  See	  Žilinčík	  &	  Spáč,	  supra	  note	  51.	  
55	  In	  2000,	  Majchrák,	  while	  in	  position	  of	  Vice-­‐president	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  addressed	  a	  critical	  letter	  to	  Štefan	  
Harabin,	  at	   that	   time	  Chief	   Justice	  of	   the	  Supreme	  Court,	  expressing	  his	   concerns	  and	  disapproval	  of	  Harabin’s	  
actions	   in	   office.	   See:	   	   http://www.sudcovia.sk/sk/dokumenty/1334-­‐otvoreny-­‐list-­‐juraja-­‐majchraka-­‐stefanovi-­‐
harabinovi-­‐z-­‐8-­‐8-­‐2000	  
56	   For	   more	   information	   about	   disciplinary	   procedures	   against	   judges	   critical	   of	   Harabin	   and	   his	   allies	   see:	  
http://www.sudcovia.sk/sk/dokumenty/disciplinarne-­‐konania/406-­‐14disck-­‐14ot	  
57	  See	  e.g.	  CEPEJ	  –	  Council	  of	  Europe,	  European	  Judicial	  Systems:	  Efficiency	  and	  Quality	  of	  Justice	  (2016).	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salaries.58	  Second,	  the	  use	  of	  case-­‐assignment	  and	  the	  re-­‐assignment	  of	  judges	  –	  especially	  
outside	  of	  their	  original	  specialization	  –	  became	  increasingly	  employed	  strategies	  used	  to	  
put	  pressure	  on,	  and	  hence	  to	  control,	  some	  judges.	  This	  all	   led	  to	  an	  initiative	  in	  2009	  in	  
which	  15	  judges	  sent	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  main	  constitutional	  officials	  of	  the	  country	  protesting	  
against	  the	  use	  of	  disciplinary	  procedures	  that	  interfered	  with	  the	  independence	  of	  judges.	  
This	   initiative	   eventually	   resulted	   in	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   Five	   Sentences	   statement	  
supported	  by	  105	  judges	  (out	  of	  approximately	  1,300).59	  
	  
3.	  Consequences	  of	  Judicial	  Self-­‐Governance:	  Broken	  Promises	  of	  the	  Euro-­‐Model	  
	  
The	  pattern	  of	  using	  power	   in	   favor	  of	   judges	   and	   their	   personal	   gains	  had	   considerable	  
spillover	  to	  the	  actual	  decision-­‐making	  of	  the	  courts.	  The	  media	  covered	  several	  issues	  that	  
suggested	   that	   courts	   at	   times	   deliver	   decisions	   that	   are	   consistently	   in	   line	   with	   some	  
actors’	  preferences,	  thus	  painting	  a	  bleak	  picture	  of	  the	  output	  independence	  of	  the	  Slovak	  
judiciary.60	  Štefan	  Harabin	  himself	  was	  particularly	  effective	  in	  defamation	  lawsuits	  against	  
the	  media	  and	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  General	  Prosecutor.61	  There	  was	  also	  a	  suspicion	  that	  the	  
president	  of	   the	   respective	  district	   court,	   a	   long-­‐time	   supporter	  of	  Harabin,	   changed	   the	  
previously	   random	   system	   of	   case	   assignment	   shortly	   before	   Harabin	   filed	   his	   lawsuit,	  
which	   could	   as	   a	   result	   be	   assigned	   only	   to	   one	   of	   three	   young	   judges.62	   In	   a	   similar	  
fashion,	  several	  of	  the	  famous	  ‘anti-­‐discriminatory’	  lawsuits	  filled	  by	  870	  judges	  against	  the	  
state	   after	   the	   Constitutional	   Court	   found	   the	   salaries	   of	   Special	   Court63	   discriminatorily	  
high	  compared	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  judiciary,64	  were	  decided	  by	  some	  of	  the	  judges	  who	  filled	  
the	  lawsuit.	  Finally,	  there	  are	  general	  concerns	  among	  the	  public	  on	  whether	  the	  judiciary	  
                                            
58	   See	   Kosař,	   supra	   note	   2,	   at	   326;	   ZUZANA	   ČAPUTOVÁ	   &	   EVA	   KOVÁČECHOVÁ,	   PRÍSTUP	   K	   SPRAVODLIVOSTI.	   BARIÉRY	   A	  
VÝCHODISKÁ.	   VYBRANÉ	   ASPEKTY	   DISCIPLINÁRNÍHO	   SÚDNICTVA,	   (2012).	   Available	   at:	   https://viaiuris.sk/wp-­‐
content/uploads/2017/08/pilk-­‐2012.pdf.	  
59	  This	  initiative	  later	  led	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  new	  judicial	  association	  called	  ‘For	  Open	  Justice’.	  For	  more	  see	  
Bojarski	  &	  Stemker	  Köster,	  supra	  note	  52,	  at	  76.	  
60	  For	  the	  definition	  of	  judicial	  independence	  as	  a	  feature	  of	  output	  see	  Popova,	  supra	  note	  15.	  
61	   The	   General	   Prosecutor	   unlawfully	   confirmed	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   recording	   of	   Harabin’s	   phone	   call	   with	   an	  
Albanian	  living	  in	  Slovakia,	  Baki	  Sadiki,	  who	  had	  in	  the	  past	  been	  accused	  of	  committing	  drug	  crimes.	  This	  incident	  
has	   been	   frequently	   used	   against	   Harabin	   by	   his	   political	   opponents	   in	   the	   public	   debate.	   See:	  Matúš	   Burčík,	  
Harabin	  dostane	  za	  potvrdenie	  telefonátu	  so	  Sadikim	  150-­‐tisíc	  eur.	  SME,	  November	  6,	  2013.	  
62	  In	  addition,	  all	  of	  these	  judges	  were	  nominated	  for	  judgeship	  in	  September	  2009	  by	  the	  JCSR,	  which	  was	  at	  the	  
time	   led	   by	   Štefan	   Harabin.	   For	   more	   see:	   Veronika	   Prušová,	   Šefka	   súdu	   pomohla	   náhode	   aj	   pri	   pridelení	  
Harabinovej	  žaloby.	  SME,	  May	  5,	  2013.	  
63	  For	  more	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  Slovak	  Specialized	  Criminal	  Court	  see:	  MATTHEW	  STEPHENSON,	  SPECIALIZED	  ANTI-­‐CORRUPTION	  
COURTS:	  SLOVAKIA	  (2016).	  
64	  Slovak	  Constitutional	  Court,	  judgment	  of	  20	  May	  2009,	  PL.	  ÚS	  17/2008.	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decides	   cases	   independently,65	   although	   these	   concerns	   may	   also	   be	   related	   to	   the	  
perception	  of	  widespread	  political	  corruption	  and	  the	  impunity	  of	  powerful	  actors.	  
	  
Figure	   1	   below	   portrays	   the	   shift	   in	   the	   competences	   of	   the	   actors	   participating	   in	   JSG	  
brought	  by	  the	   introduction	  of	  the	  JCSR.	  The	  early	  1990s	  political	  system	  understood	  JSG	  
as	  a	  product	  of	  the	  interaction	  of	  the	  triangle	  of	  actors:	  the	  parliament,	  the	  Ministry,	  and	  
the	   judiciary.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   concentration	   of	   power	   was	   clearly	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   the	  
executive	  (Figure	  1,	  black	  grading),	  which	  under	  the	  government	  of	  PM	  Mečiar	  controlled	  
both	  the	  parliament	  and	  the	  court	  presidents	  (via	  ministerial	  nominations).	  After	  1998,	  the	  
Slovak	  judiciary	  gained	  considerable	  powers	  regarding	  its	  own	  administration,	  particularly	  
those	   concerned	   with	   the	   professional	   careers	   of	   judges.	   The	   year	   2002	   and	   the	  
introduction	   of	   the	   JCSR	   shifted	   this	   triangle	   and	   almost	   completely	   eliminated	   the	  
influence	  of	  the	  National	  Council,	  although,	  as	  we	  will	  argue	  later,	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  JCSR	  
on	  the	  separation	  of	  powers	  and	  shape	  of	  the	  democratic	  political	  system	  were	  lacking	  in	  
the	   Slovak	   discussions	   surrounding	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   Council.	   Still,	   the	   JCSR’s	  
introduction	  shifted	  the	  influence	  and	  position	  of	  individual	  constitutional	  actors.	  Most	  of	  
the	  powers	  are	  currently	  concentrated	  with	  the	  JCSR	  itself.	  Court	  presidents	  are	  potentially	  
still	  one	  of	  the	  important	  stakeholders,	  although	  they	  do	  not	  exercise	  this	  power.	  
	  
Figure	  1:	  Competences	  of	  judicial	  governance	  actors	  (Source:	  authors)	  
	  
                                            
65	   For	   instance,	   in	   the	   Global	   Corruption	   Barometer	   2013,	   the	   judiciary	   was	   perceived	   as	   the	   most	   corrupt	  
institution	   in	   Slovakia.	   Transparency	   International,	   GLOBAL	   CORRUPTION	   BAROMETER	   (2013).	   Also,	   concerns	   about	  
independence	   can	  be	   found	   in	  Klaus	  Schwab	  and	  Xavier	   Sala-­‐i-­‐Martín,	   THE	  GLOBAL	  COMPETITIVENESS	  REPORT	  2015-­‐
2016	  (2016).	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However,	  the	  Euro-­‐model	  failed	  to	  deliver	  what	  was	  expected.	  Not	  only	  did	  the	  JCSR	  fail	  to	  
eliminate	  possible	  undue	  influence	  over	  the	  judiciary	  exercised	  through	  the	  administration	  
of	   professional	   careers,	   but	   under	   Harabin’s	   chairmanship,	   accountability	   mechanisms	  
suffered	  even	  more	  deficiencies	  than	  before	  and	  became	  tools	  for	  rewarding	  his	  allies	  and	  
punishing	   his	   critics	   and	   opponents.	   These	   practices,	   reminiscent	   of	   ‘mafia-­‐like	  
structures’,66	   led	  to	  a	  deep	  divide	  within	  the	  judicial	  branch,	  while	  increasing	  the	  salience	  
of	  judicial	  issues	  among	  the	  public	  and	  politicians.	  
	  
III.	  Building	  (New)	  Trust	  between	  Judges	  and	  Politicians?	  (2010	  –	  2017)	  
	  
Harabin’s	  era	  in	  the	  most	  powerful	  position	  in	  the	  Slovak	  judicial	  system	  attracted	  a	  lot	  of	  
attention	   from	   unlikely	   sources.	   In	   June	   2009,	   on	   the	   day	   of	   his	   election	   to	   the	   post	   of	  
Chairman	  of	  the	  JCSR,	  approximately	  300	  people	  protested	  in	  front	  of	  the	  building	  where	  
the	   election	  was	   taking	   place.	   The	   demonstration	  was	   led	   by	   the	  NGO	   Fair-­‐Play	   Alliance	  
and	  was	  supported	  by	  many	  judges,	  lawyers	  and	  public	  figures.67	  Disciplinary	  proceedings	  
against	   Harabin’s	   critics	   were	   attended	   by	   embassy	   representatives	   from	   some	   of	  
Slovakia’s	  allies	  in	  the	  EU	  and	  NATO.68	  The	  2010	  Parliamentary	  elections	  brought	  to	  power	  
a	  new	  coalition	   led	  by	   Iveta	  Radičová.	   Its	  Minister	  of	   Justice,	   Lucia	  Žitňanská,	  was	  clearly	  
determined	  to	  limit	  the	  power	  of	  judges	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  the	  repetition	  of	  past	  events.	  
This	   intention	  remained	  even	  when	  after	  the	  breakdown	  of	  the	  government	  in	   late	  2011,	  
and	  consequently,	  after	  the	  2012	  elections	  which	  led	  to	  SMER-­‐SD,	  a	  leftist	  party	  and	  main	  
coalition	  partner	  of	  2006-­‐2010	  government,	  being	  able	  to	  form	  the	  government	  by	  itself.	  
	  
The	  2011	  reform	  focused	  on	  procedures	  regulating	  the	  selection,	  promotion	  and	  discipline	  
of	  judges	  and	  aimed	  at	  a	  considerable	  increase	  in	  the	  transparency	  of	  the	  judicial	  branch.69	  
First,	  as	   regards	   the	  selection	  of	   judges,	   the	  new	   law	   introduced	  selection	  through	  open,	  
competitive	   and	   very	   structured	   procedures.	   The	   committees	   selecting	   new	   judges	  
consisted	  of	  at	  least	  three	  judges	  –	  two	  nominated	  by	  the	  JCSR,	  and	  one	  nominated	  by	  the	  
judicial	  board	  of	  the	  court	  where	  the	  procedure	  was	  taking	  place,	  counterbalanced	  by	  two	  
members	   nominated	   by	   political	   branches,	   ensuring	   the	   dominance	   of	   the	   judiciary.70	  
Despite	   the	   introduction	  of	  mandatory	   selection	  procedures,	   the	  process	   still	   seemed	   to	  
                                            
66	  See	  Bobek	  &	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  5.	  
67	   Červená	   pre	   Harabina,	   Pluska,	   June	   10,	   2009.	   Available	   at:	   http://www.pluska.sk/old/aktuality/cervena-­‐pre-­‐
harabina.html	  
68	   Veronika	   Prušová,	   Harabin:	   Diplomati	   si	   kupujú	   sudcov	   darčekmi,	   SME,	   May	   20,	   2010.	   Available	   at:	  
https://domov.sme.sk/c/5383790/harabin-­‐diplomati-­‐si-­‐kupuju-­‐sudcov-­‐darcekmi.html	  
69	  See	  the	  following	  Section	  and	  SAMUEL	  SPÁČ,	  MATEJ	  ŠIMALČÍK	  &	  GABRIEL	  ŠÍPOŠ,	  LET’S	  JUDGE	  THE	  JUDGES:	  HOW	  SLOVAKIA	  
OPENED	  ITS	  JUDICIARY	  TO	  UNPRECEDENTED	  PUBLIC	  CONTROL	  (2018).	  
70	   After	   the	   reform	   there	  were	   actually	   three	   political	   nominees	   and	   two	   judicial	   nominees,	   which	  was	   struck	  
down	  by	  the	  Constitutional	  Court.	  See	  Section	  C.I.	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favor	  candidates	  with	  ties	  to	  the	  judiciary	  –	  either	  family	  relations	  or	  connections	  to	  people	  
sitting	   on	   the	   selection	   committees.71	   As	   a	   consequence,	   in	   2017,	   the	   new	   government	  
attempted	   to	   restructure	   the	   process	   and	   fill	   all	   vacant	   district	   court	   positions	   through	  
collective	   selection	   procedures	   organized	   at	   the	   regional	   courts.	   New	   judges	   are	   now	  
selected	  by	  five-­‐member	  committees	  consisting	  of	  two	  members	  nominated	  by	  the	  JCSR,	  
two	  members	   nominated	  by	   the	  Minister,	   and	  one	  member	   elected	  by	   the	   collegium	  of	  
judicial	  boards	  of	  the	  given	  region.	  
	  
In	  2011,	   the	  process	  of	  promoting	   judges	   to	  higher	   courts	  was	   transformed	   in	  2011	   in	   a	  
similar	  fashion.	  At	  that	  time,	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  committee	  was	  at	  the	  time	  similar,	  but	  
a	  change	  implemented	  in	  2017	  meant	  that	  the	  president	  of	  the	  regional	  court,	  or	  the	  Chief	  
Justice	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   would	   create	   a	   five-­‐member	   committee	   in	   which	   one	  
member	  is	  selected	  from	  the	  list	  created	  by	  the	  JCSR,	  two	  are	  selected	  from	  the	  list	  crated	  
by	  the	  Minister,	  one	  is	  elected	  by	  the	  judicial	  board	  of	  the	  given	  court,	  and	  one	  is	  elected	  
by	  the	  collegium	  in	  which	  there	  is	  a	  vacant	  position.	  	  
	  
Changes	  in	  the	  processes	  of	  selecting	  and	  promoting	  judges	  resulted	  in	  more	  involvement	  
of	   the	   other	   branches	   of	   power.	   Somewhat	   similar	   logic	   guided	   changes	   related	   to	   the	  
composition	   of	   disciplinary	   senates.	   Since	   2012,	   there	   has	   been	   an	   obligation	   to	   include	  
non-­‐judicial	   members	   to	   ensure	   a	   lay	   component	   counterweighing	   judicial	   dominance,	  
which	  had	  proved	  to	  be	  hazardous	  in	  the	  previous	  years.	  	  
	  
The	  process	  of	  selecting	  court	  presidents	  went	  through	  a	  somewhat	  similar	  modification,	  
but	   in	   reverse.	   The	   executive	   had	   held	   this	   almost	   unrestricted	   competence	   for	   years.	  
However,	   since	  2011,	   court	  presidents	   are	   also	   selected	  by	   five-­‐member	   committees.	  As	  
many	   as	   three	   members	   of	   the	   committee	   are	   nominated	   by	   the	   Minister	   of	   Justice,	  
meaning	   the	   executive	   branch	   has	   retained	   control	   over	   the	   process,	   but	   the	   remaining	  
spots	  are	  reserved	  for	  one	  judge	  nominated	  by	  the	  JCSR,	  and	  one	  by	  the	  judicial	  board	  of	  
the	  court.	  
	  
Finally,	   a	  major	   change	   regarding	   the	  composition	  of	   the	   JCSR	  –	   the	   first	  and	   so	   far	  only	  
since	   its	   establishment	   –	   took	   place	   in	   2014.	   In	   order	   to	   avoid	   concentrating	   too	  much	  
power	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  one	  actor,	  the	  positions	  of	  the	  Chairman	  of	  the	  JCSR	  and	  the	  Chief	  
Justice	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  were	  separated.	  Consequently,	  the	  number	  of	  judges	  elected	  
by	  judges	  was	  raised	  to	  nine.	  	  
	  
Developments	  since	  2010	   in	   the	  matter	  of	  administering	   judicial	  careers	  show	  that	   there	  
was,	   just	   as	   in	   any	   other	   relationship	   where	   the	   trust	   between	   partners	   has	   been	  
repeatedly	  trampled,	  a	  need	  to	  demarcate	  new	  boundaries	  aimed	  at	  building	  trust	  among	  
                                            
71	  For	  more	  see:	  Samuel	  Spáč,	  BY	  THE	  JUDGES,	  FOR	  THE	  JUDGES:	  THE	  STUDY	  OF	  JUDICIAL	  SELECTION	  IN	  SLOVAKIA,	  (Dissertation	  
Thesis,	  Comenius	  University,	  2017),	  at	  90–125.	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actors.	   These	   new	   developments	   have	   common	   themes:	   adopting	   new	   checks	   and	  
balances	   into	   previously	   existing	   mechanisms	   as	   well	   as	   preventing	   a	   dangerous	  
concentration	   of	   powers,	   both	   without	   compromising	   the	   core	   idea	   of	   the	   judicial	  
administration	  that	  has	  been	  in	  place	  since	  2001	  –	  i.e.	  the	  dominance	  of	  the	  judicial	  branch	  
over	  other	  branches	  of	  government.	  	  
	  




It	  can	  therefore	  be	  concluded	  that	  there	  are	  three	  categories	  of	  ties	  between	  the	  JCSR	  and	  
other	   bodies	   taking	   part	   in	   JSG.	   The	   first	   is	   a	   group	   of	   bodies	   that	   are	   predominantly	  
created	  by	  the	  JCSR	  and	  belong	  under	  its	  sphere	  of	  influence;	  this	  group	  is	  represented	  by	  
the	  disciplinary	  senates	  and	  the	  Judicial	  Academy.	  The	  second	  group	  is	  comprised	  of	  bodies	  
that	  are	  semi-­‐independent	  of	  the	  JCSR;	  the	  JCSR	  has	  only	  limited	  influence	  in	  the	  selection	  
of	  its	  members,	  although	  it	  may	  also	  act	  as	  a	  gatekeeper.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  rarely	  uses	  these	  
competences.	  The	  third	  category	  represents	   independent	   JSG	  bodies	   (judicial	  boards	  and	  
court	  presidents),	  which	  interact	  but	  do	  not	  depend	  on	  the	  JCSR.	  	  
	  
 
C.	  Judicial	  Administration	  and	  the	  ‘Outside’	  World:	  Legitimacy,	  Public	  Confidence,	  and	  
Transparency	  
	  
As	  shown	  in	  the	  previous	  sections,	  Slovakia	  enacted	  the	  recommended	  model	  of	  JSG	  in	  the	  
form	  of	  a	  strong	  judicial	  council	  with	  a	  majority	  representation	  of	  judges.	  Yet	  the	  turbulent	  
political	  and	  societal	  developments	  in	  the	  1990s	  justly	  raise	  questions	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  
JCSR	   on	   the	   judiciary	   and	   its	   position	  within	   the	   political	   system.	   This	   section	   therefore	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moves	  from	  the	  legalistic	  and	  normative	  historical	  description	  of	  the	  Slovak	  JSG	  model	  and	  
focuses	   more	   on	   its	   impact	   and	   social	   acceptance,	   with	   specific	   attention	   paid	   to	   the	  
legitimacy	   of	   the	   judiciary,	   transparency	   of	   the	   court	   system	   and	   of	   the	   judicial	  
administration,	   and	   the	   development	   of	   public	   trust	   in	   the	   judiciary	   and	   its	   relation	   to	  
changing	  JSG.	  	  
	  
I.	  Legal	  and	  Normative	  Legitimacy	  of	  the	  Slovak	  Judiciary	  
	  
The	  JCSR,	  as	  a	  central	  institution	  in	  the	  Slovak	  system	  of	  judicial	  administration,	  is	  intended	  
be	   a	   body	   that	   represents	   judicial	   legitimacy,	   which,	   together	   with	   independence	   and	  
accountability,	  belongs	  among	  the	  core	  elements	  of	  judicial	  systems.72	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  difficult	  
to	   untangle	   what	   legitimacy	   actually	   means.	   There	   is	   a	   plethora	   of	   academic	   works	  
analyzing	   different	   dimensions	   of	   legitimacy,73	   suggesting	   there	   is	   no	   common	  
understanding	   of	   the	   concept.74	   In	   the	   following	   part	   we	   differentiate	   between	   legal	  
legitimacy/legality,75	  the	  normative	  dimension	  of	  legitimacy,76	  and	  its	  social	  dimension.77	  
	  
The	   legal	   legitimacy	   of	   judicial	   administration	   and	   the	   bodies	   conducting	   it	   is	   secured	  
through	   the	   entrenchment	   of	   all	   of	   the	   core	   regulations	   in	   the	   Act	   on	   Judges	   and	   Lay	  
Judges78	  and	  the	  Act	  on	  Courts.79	  Above	  that	  stands	  the	  JCSR,	  which	  is	  both	  rooted	  in	  the	  
Constitution80	  and	  further	  regulated	  by	  the	  Act	  on	  the	  JCSR.81	  Additionally,	  the	  Constitution	  
                                            
72	   On	   the	   concept	   of	   legitimacy	   see	   e.g.	   James	   L.	   Gibson,	   Gregory	   A.	   Caldeira	   &	   Vanessa	   A.	   Baird,	   On	   the	  
Legitimacy	   of	   National	   High	   Courts,	   92	   THE	   AMERICAN	   POLITICAL	   SCIENCE	   REVIEW	   343	   (1998),	   at	   343;	   and	   W.	   S.	  
Richards,	   Survey	   article:	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   Supreme	   Courts	   in	   the	   context	   of	   globalization,	   4	   UTRECHT	   L.R.	   104	  
(2008),	  at	  104.	  
73	   	   	   See	   e.g.	   Peter	   G.	   Stillman,	   The	   Concept	   of	   Legitimacy,	   7	   POLITY	   32	   (1974),	   at	   32;	   and	   David	   Beetham,	   THE	  
LEGITIMATION	  OF	  POWER	  (2013),	  or	  Başak	  Çalı,	  Anne	  Koch,	  Nicola	  Bruch,	  The	  Legitimacy	  of	  Human	  Rights	  Courts,	  A	  
Grounded	  Interpretivist	  Analysis	  of	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  35	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS	  QUARTERLY	  955	  (2013),	  
at	  955.	  
74	  See	  e.g.	  CARL	  SCHMITT,	  LEGALITY	  AND	  LEGITIMACY	  (2004);	  and	  DAVID	  DYZENHAUS,	  LEGALITY	  AND	  LEGITIMACY:	  CARL	  SCHMITT,	  
HANS	  KELSEN	  AND	  HERMAN	  HELLER	  IN	  WEIMAR	  (1999).	  
75	  Supra	  note	  74;	  and	  various	  contributions	  in:	  LEGITIMACY	  IN	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	  (Rudiger	  Wolfrum	  &	  Volker	  Roben	  
ed.	  2008).	  	  
76	   Allen	   Buchanan	   &	   Robert	   Keohane.	   The	   Legitimacy	   of	   Global	   Governance	   Institutions.	   20.4	   ETHICS	   &	  
INTERNATIONAL	  AFFAIRS	  405	  (2006).	  	  
77	  Mark	  C.	   Suchman,	  Managing	  Legitimacy:	   Strategic	  and	   Institutional	  Approaches,	   20	  ACADEMY	  OF	  MANAGEMENT	  
REVIEW	  571	  (1995),	  at	  571.	  	  
78	  Act	  No.	  385/2000	  Coll.	  
79	  Act	  No.	  757/2004	  Coll.	  
80	  Art.	  141a	  of	  the	  Slovak	  Constitution	  
81	  Act	  No.	  185/2002	  Coll	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raises	  the	  demand	  that	  the	  judiciary	  be	  independent	  and	  impartial,82	  however	  it	  does	  not	  
specify	   the	   normative	   meaning	   of	   this	   provision.	   From	   this	   perspective,	   the	   normative	  
legitimacy	  of	  the	  existing	  model	  of	  judicial	  administration	  is	  secured	  in	  two	  ways:	  first,	  by	  
the	  set	  of	   international	   recommendations	  on	  fostering	   judicial	   independence	  that	  guided	  
the	  2001	  Constitutional	  amendment,83	  and	  second,	  through	  the	  Constitutional	  Court’s	  case	  
law,	  which	  clarified	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  formal	  rules	  and	  provisions	  regulating	  the	  
JSCR	  and	  the	  principles	  of	  judicial	  independence.84	  
	  
There	   have	   been	   two	   decisions	   that	   interpreted	   whether	   the	   legally	   enacted	   model	  
conforms	   to	   the	   ideals	   of	   the	   rule	   of	   law,	   the	   separation	   of	   powers	   and	   the	   judicial	  
independence	  entrenched	  in	  the	  Constitution.	  First,	  in	  2014,	  upon	  a	  petition	  submitted	  by	  
a	   group	   of	   MPs,	   the	   Constitutional	   Court	   decided85	   that	   the	   composition	   of	   selection	  
committees	   under	   the	   2011	   reform,86	   which	   gives	   a	   majority	   to	   nominees	   of	   political	  
branches,	   breaches	   the	   idea	   of	   independence.87	   Additionally,	   the	   same	   decision	   also	  
declared	   it	  unconstitutional	   for	   the	  Minister	  of	   Justice	   to	  dismiss	   court	  presidents	  at	  her	  
own	   discretion	   –	   this,	   as	   we	   have	   shown,	   was	   a	   common	   practice	   in	   past.	   The	  
Constitutional	  Court	  admitted	  that	  while	  the	  competence	  of	  the	  Minister	  has	  a	  clear	  basis	  
in	  the	   law,	   it	  also	  pointed	  out	  the	   lack	  of	  any	  safeguards	  against	   the	  arbitrary	  use	  of	   this	  
competence.	  	  
	  
In	  a	  2015	  decision,	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  expressed	  another	  legitimacy	  concern	  when	  it	  
sided	  in	  favor	  of	  legislation	  that	  held	  that	  it	  was	  at	  odds	  to	  concurrently	  serve	  as	  both	  court	  
president	  (or	  vice-­‐president)	  and	  a	  member	  of	  the	  JCSR.	  As	  court	  presidents	  are	  appointed	  
by	  the	  Minister,	  there	  were	  concerns	  that	  doubts	  would	  be	  cast	  on	  such	  members	  due	  to	  
conflicts	   of	   interest.88	   In	   both	   of	   these	   decisions,	   the	   Constitutional	   Court	   justified	   its	  
decisions	  with	  direct	  references	  to	  the	  JCSR’s	  role	  of	  ensuring	   judicial	   legitimacy.	  We	  can	  
therefore	  argue	   that	   the	  Constitutional	  Court	  protects	   judicial	   legitimacy	  by	  demarcating	  
the	  borders	  of	  permissible	  political	  involvement	  in	  the	  administration	  of	  judicial	  careers.	  
                                            
82	  Art.	  141	  of	  the	  Slovak	  Constitution	  	  
83	  See	  the	  Section	  B.2.I.	  
84	  It	  needs	  to	  be	  stressed	  that	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  cannot	  initiate	  a	  review,	  and	  hence	  acts	  only	  if	  some	  other	  
institution	   files	   a	  petition.	  Within	   the	   scope	   of	   judicial	   administration,	   this	   power	   belongs	   to	   the	   JCSR,	   among	  
other	  actors.	  
85	  Slovak	  Constitutional	  Court,	  judgment	  of	  8	  May	  2014,	  PL.	  ÚS	  102/2011.	  	  
86	  See	  the	  Section	  B.3.	  
87	  The	  JCSR,	  led	  by	  Harabin,	  refused	  to	  nominate	  judges	  selected	  by	  such	  committees	  for	  appointment.	  After	  the	  
change	   in	   government	   in	   2012,	   Minister	   Tomáš	   Borec	   sought	   compromise	   by	   nominating,	   almost	   exclusively,	  
judges	  on	  his	  ‘list’	  who	  would	  eventually	  be	  accepted	  by	  the	  JCSR.	  
88	  Slovak	  Constitutional	  Court,	  judgement	  of	  November	  8,	  2015,	  PL.	  ÚS	  2/2012.	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II.	  Wider	  effects	  of	  the	  JSG:	  Public	  Confidence	  in	  the	  Slovak	  Judiciary	  
	  
The	  establishment	  of	  the	  JCSR	  and	  its	  turbulent,	  and	  at	  times	  controversial,	  development	  
also	   influenced	   the	   relationship	   of	   the	   judicial	   system	   with	   the	   world	   beyond	   political	  
institutions,	  particularly	  the	  relationship	  with	  the	  public.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  important	  facets	  
of	  this	  relationship	  is	  public	  confidence	  in	  the	  judiciary,	  which	  can	  be	  described	  as	  positive	  
expectations	  regarding	  the	  conduct	  of	  judges	  and	  courts.89	  	  
	  
As	   regards	   the	  public’s	   confidence	   in	   the	  Slovak	   judiciary,	   the	  picture	  has	  been	  bleak	   for	  
years:	  public	   confidence	   in	   the	  Slovak	   justice/legal	   system	  constantly	  belongs	  among	   the	  
lowest	   in	   the	  entire	  European	  Union.90	  Figure	  3	   shows	   that	   the	   level	  of	  public	  distrust	   in	  
the	  courts	  rose	  markedly	  between	  1997	  and	  200291	  and	  it	  has	  remained	  high	  ever	  since,	  in	  
spite	  of	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  Judicial	  Council	   in	  2001.	  Throughout	  the	  last	  decade,	  only	  
roughly	  one-­‐third	  of	  Slovak	  citizens	  claimed	  to	  have	  trust	  in	  the	  courts.	  In	  2016,	  the	  share	  
of	  distrusting	  respondents	  decreased	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  a	  decade.	  This	  could	  be	  related	  to	  
the	  reassignment	  of	  those	  who	  held	  top	  positions	  of	  the	  judiciary,	  and	  fewer	  scandals	  and	  




	   	  
                                            
89	   Roy	   J.	   Lewicki,	   Daniel	   J.	  McAllister	   &	   Robert	   J.	   Bies	   Trust	   and	   Distrust:	   New	   Relationships	   and	   Realities,	   23	  
ACADEMY	  OF	  MANAGEMENT	  REVIEW	  438	  (1998),	  at	  438–58.	  
90	  Eurobarometer	  385.	  JUSTICE	  IN	  THE	  EU.	  
91	   Besides	   other	   factors,	   a	   steep	   increase	   of	   distrust	   between	   1997	   and	   2002	   could	   be	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	  
widespread	   feeling	   of	   injustice	   related	   to	   general	   political	   atmosphere	   in	   the	   country	   and	   its	   various	   financial	  
frauds,	  and	  even	  murders,	  which	  had	  not	  been	   investigated	  and	   their	   culprits	   remained	  unconvicted.	   So-­‐called	  
Mečiar´s	  amnesties	  can	  serve	  as	  an	  example	  which	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  affect	  overall	  perception	  of	  justice	  in	  the	  
society.	   For	  more	   on	  Mečiar’s	   amnesties,	   which	  were	   eventually	   scrapped	   by	   the	   parliament	   in	   2017,	   see	   for	  
instance	   Michal	   Ovádek,	   „Unrichtiges	   Recht“	   in	   Slovakia?	   The	   Radbruch	   Formula	   and	   Positive	   Law	   from	   the	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It	   can	   be	   assumed	   that	   the	   main	   cause	   of	   public	   distrust	   lies	   in	   the	   perceived	   lack	   of	  
independence	   of	   courts	   and	   judges:	   only	   one-­‐fifth	   of	   Slovak	   citizens	   consider	   the	  
independence	  of	  the	  judiciary	  as	  very	  or	  fairly	  good,93	  which	  is	  the	  lowest	  share	  in	  the	  EU.	  
Respondents	   predominantly	   stated	   that	   interference	   and	  pressure	   from	   the	   government	  
and	  politicians	  was	   the	  main	   reason	   for	   their	  mistrust.	  Other	   factors	  potentially	   lowering	  
the	   level	   of	   public	   confidence	   are	   widespread	   nepotism	   among	   the	   judges,94	   perceived	  
excessive	  length	  of	  proceedings,95	  perceived	  corruption	  in	  the	  judiciary	  and	  prosecution,96	  
                                            
92	   Source:	   Via	   Iuris,	   Focus	   2015	   (Via	   Iuris,	   Focus.	   Vývoj	   nedôvery	   v	   súdy	   a	   súdnictvo,	   roky	   1997-­‐2015.	  
https://www.aktuality.sk/foto/305603/5/tri-­‐stvrtiny-­‐slovakov-­‐nedoveruju-­‐sudom-­‐a-­‐dovera-­‐sudnictva-­‐stale-­‐
klesa/);	   Via	   Iuris	   2016	   (Via	   Iuris.	   Správa	   z	   prieskumu	   verejnej	   mienky	   o	   dôvere	   verejnosti	   k	   súdom.	  
http://www.viaiuris.sk/wp-­‐content/uploads/2016/10/Spr%C3%A1va-­‐z-­‐prieskumu-­‐d%C3%B4vera-­‐verejnosti-­‐
vo%C4%8Di-­‐s%C3%BAdom-­‐2016.pdf).	  The	  question	  asked	  was:	  “To	  what	  extent	  do	  you	  trust	  or	  distrust	  the	  courts	  
and	   the	   judiciary?”	   Possible	   answers:	   I	   definitely	   trust/I	   rather	   trust/I	   rather	   distrust/I	   definitely	   distrust	   them.	  
Legend:	  The	  data	  in	  the	  figure	  represent	  the	  share	  of	  respondents	  who	  rather	  +	  definitely	  distrust	  the	  courts	  and	  
the	  judiciary.	  
93	  The	  2016	  EU	  Justice	  Scoreboard.	  
94	  According	   to	  Transparency	   International	  Slovakia,	  every	   fifth	   judge	  has	  a	  close	   family	   relationship	   to	  another	  
judge	  or	  other	  court	  employee.	  See	  Šipoš,	  Spáč	  &	  Klátik,	  supra	  note	  47.	  	  
95	   Eurobarometer,	   supra	  note	  90.	  According	   to	   the	  2016	  EU	   Justice	   Scoreboard,	   the	  estimated	   time	  needed	   to	  
resolve	  a	  case	  in	  court	  (meaning	  the	  time	  taken	  by	  the	  court	  to	  reach	  an	  initial	  decision)	  was	  238	  days	  in	  Slovakia,	  
only	  slightly	  above	  the	  average	  of	  225	  days	  calculated	  for	  21	  EU	  countries.	  
96	   FOCUS.	  Percepcia	   korupcie	   na	   Slovensku.	   Prieskum	  verejnej	  mienky	  pre	   Transparency	   International	   Slovensko	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perceived	   lack	   of	   fairness	   of	   judgements,97	   and	   perceived	   low	   intelligibility	   of	   judicial	  
decisions.98	  From	  this	  perspective,	  it	  must	  be	  concluded	  that	  a	  strong	  JSG	  has	  been	  unable	  
to	   significantly	   improve	   the	   performance	   of	   the	   Slovak	   judiciary,	   or	   at	   least	   its	   public	  
image.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  credibility	  of	  courts	  and	  judges	  has	  been	  further	  damaged	  
by	   their	   numerous	   scandals	   and	   affairs,99	   often	   involving	   those	   in	   top	   positions,	   most	  
prominently	  the	  previously-­‐mentioned	  Štefan	  Harabin.100	  	  
	  
Thus,	  to	  put	  it	  bluntly,	  Slovakia	  can	  serve	  as	  definite	  proof	  that	  the	  mere	  transfer	  of	  power	  
into	   the	   hands	   of	   judges	   (e.g.	   via	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   judicial	   council)	   does	   not	  
automatically	  lead	  to	  higher	  public	  confidence	  in	  courts	  and	  the	  judiciary.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  
when	   the	   judiciary	   is	   represented	  and	  governed	  by	   judges	  who	  do	  not	   inspire	   trust,	   and	  
when	  these	  top	  representatives	  instead	  cause	  scandals	  and	  affairs	  rather	  than	  help	  to	  set	  
them	  right,	  the	  strong	  model	  of	  JSG	  can	  lead	  to	  the	  corrosion	  of	  public	  confidence	  in	  the	  
judiciary.	  
	  
III.	  Transparency	  of	  the	  Slovak	  Judiciary	  
	  
The	  low	  level	  of	  public	  confidence	  accompanied	  by	  problems	  such	  as	  perceived	  corruption	  
and	  nepotism	  were	  the	  main	  reasons	  why	  the	  2011	  reform	  saw	  a	  considerable	  increase	  in	  
transparency	   of	   the	   judicial	   system	   and	   the	   processes	   related	   to	   judges	   and	   their	  
professional	   careers.101	  Prior	   to	   this,	   a	  major	   improvement	   in	   transparency	  of	   the	  Slovak	  
judiciary	  emerged	  with	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  JCSR.	  Since	  2003,	  the	  JCSR	  has	  published	  
documents	  regarding	  its	  operation	  on	  its	  website,	  however	  for	  years	  this	  has	  only	  included	  
the	   publication	   of	   resolutions	   adopted	   by	   the	   JCSR,	   without	   any	   information	   about	   its	  
meetings.	   Also,	   the	   JCSR	   has,	   practically	   since	   its	   establishment,	   published	   anonymized	  
decisions	  of	  disciplinary	  senates	  on	  its	  website.	  	  
	  
                                            
97	  Eurobarometer,	  supra	  note	  90.	  
98	  Eurobarometer,	  supra	  note	  90.	  
99	  E.g.	  in	  the	  so-­‐called	  Bonanno	  affair,	  four	  judges	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  sued	  the	  tabloid	  Nový	  Čas	  for	  publishing	  
pictures	   from	   their	   private	   party	   held	   in	   2011.	   The	   pictures	   captured	   their	   host	   welcoming	   them	   with	   a	  
submachine	  gun	  and	  blue	  ear-­‐protectors,	  imitating	  the	  mass	  murderer	  who	  shot	  dead	  seven	  persons	  in	  Bratislava	  
two	  months	  earlier.	  In	  2017,	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  overturned	  the	  decisions	  of	  district	  and	  regional	  courts	  and	  
stated	  that	  the	  daily	  does	  not	  need	  to	  apologize	  nor	  pay	  any	  compensation.	  
100	  See	  Section	  B.II.2.	  For	   instance,	  the	  media	  published	  the	  transcripts	  of	  Harabin´s	   intimate	  1994	  conversation	  
with	  an	  Albanian	  drug	  mafia	  boss,	  and	  a	   former	  attorney	  general	   indirectly	   confirmed	   its	  authenticity	   (Harabin	  
later	  sue	  him	  for	  doing	  so).	  Among	  other	  scandals,	  he	  repeatedly	  publicly	   insulted	  other	   judges	  or	  members	  of	  
Judicial	   Councils	   (e.g.	   calling	   them	   "juristutes"),	   and	   has	   several	   times	   been	   accused	   of	   bullying	   judges	   and	  
attempting	   to	   influence	   their	   verdicts.	   See,	   e.g.	  Martin	  M.	   ŠIMEČKA,	  The	  Crooked	   Judges	  of	   Slovakia.	   RESPEKT,	  
November	  20,	  2012.	  Available	  at:	  https://www.respekt.cz/respekt-­‐in-­‐english/the-­‐crooked-­‐judges-­‐of-­‐slovakia.	  	  
101	  For	  a	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  changes	  see	  SPÁČ,	  ŠIMALČÍK	  &	  ŠÍPOŠ,	  supra	  note	  69.	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  Since	  this	  reform,	  the	  JCSR	  publishes	  minutes	  from	  each	  meeting	  together	  with	  their	  audio	  
recordings.	  Before	  any	  meeting,	  all	  discussed	  documents	  need	  to	  be	  published	  as	  well.	  The	  
JCSR	  is	  also	  responsible	  for	  publishing	  the	  asset	  disclosures	  of	  all	  judges,	  which	  includes	  a	  
list	  of	  a	   judge’s	   family	  members	  working	   in	   the	   judicial	   system	  or	   in	  organizations	   in	   the	  
Ministry’s	  portfolio,	  e.g.	  state	  penitentiaries.	  
	  
In	  addition,	   since	   the	   reform,	  courts	  are	  obliged	   to	  publish	  all	   their	   final	  decisions	  online	  
within	  15	  days	  after	   they	  come	   into	   force.	  Similarly,	   courts	  publish	   information	  about	  all	  
scheduled	  hearings,	  including	  dates,	  times,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  names	  of	  parties	  in	  criminal	  and	  
administrative	  cases.102	  Furthermore,	  as	   regards	   the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  operations	  of	   the	  courts,	  
each	  court	  is	  obliged	  to	  publish	  its	  work	  schedules	  and	  all	  of	  their	  amendments.103	  All	  this	  
information	   is	   published	   on	   the	   Ministry’s	   website;	   the	   only	   exception	   is	   the	   Supreme	  
Court,	  which	  publishes	  its	  decisions	  separately	  on	  its	  own	  website.	  Courts	  are	  also	  obliged	  
to	   publish	   two	   types	   of	   information	   about	   individual	   judges	   or	   candidates	   for	   judicial	  
positions.	   First,	   ‘annual	   statistical	   reports’	   include	   descriptive	   information	   about	   the	  
performance	  of	  each	  judge,	  such	  as	  the	  number	  of	  assigned	  and	  resolved	  cases	  in	  a	  given	  
period,	  as	  well	  as	   information	  about	  a	  judge’s	  docket,	  or	  how	  a	  higher	  court	  had	  decided	  
on	  appeals	  to	  their	  decisions.	  From	  a	  transparency	  perspective	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  stressed	  that	  
they	   are	   difficult	   to	   understand	   and	   are	   not	   necessarily	   helpful,	   either	   for	   better	  
understanding	  the	  system	  or	  in	  holding	  it	  accountable.104	  Courts	  are	  also	  obliged	  to	  publish	  
detailed	   information	   about	   selection	   procedures	   for	   all	   judicial	   positions	   including	   the	  
résumés	   of	   all	   candidates,	   their	   motivation	   letters,	   candidates’	   disclosures	   about	   family	  
ties	  in	  the	  judiciary,	  as	  well	  as	  detailed	  reports	  from	  these	  procedures.105	  	  
	  
All	  in	  all,	  the	  effects	  of	  establishing	  a	  strong	  JSG	  in	  Slovakia	  are	  rather	  mixed.	  On	  one	  hand,	  
the	  legal	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  judicial	  system	  is	  secured	  by	  the	  entrenchment	  of	  all	  institutions	  
playing	  a	   role	   in	  administration,	  either	   in	   the	  Constitution	  or	   in	   laws,	  while	   its	  normative	  
content	   is	   protected	   by	   the	   Constitutional	   Court.	   Rather	   recently,	   this	   problem	   has	   also	  
been	  addressed	  by	  a	  considerable	  increase	  in	  the	  transparency	  of	  the	  system,	  however	  its	  
effect	  cannot	  be	  assessed	  with	  confidence	  at	  this	  point.	  
	  
                                            
102	   This	   fact	   effectively	   de-­‐anonymizes	   decisions,	   which	   themselves	   are	   made	   anonymous.	   It	   possibly	   raises	   a	  
concern	  about	  the	  conflict	  between	  transparency	  and	  protection	  of	  privacy.	  
103	  Work	  schedules	  contain	  information	  about	  the	  composition	  of	  senates,	  rules	  of	  case	  assignment	  or	  time-­‐slots	  
allocated	  for	  the	  hearings	  of	  each	  judge.	  
104	   So	   far,	   there	  has	  only	  been	  one	  attempt	   to	  make	   sense	  of	   this	  data.	   See:	   Samuel	   Spáč,	   Judging	   the	   Judges:	  
Measuring	   Performance	   of	   District	   Court	   Judges	   in	   Slovakia	   (2015)	   (unpublished	   manuscript,	   available	   at:	  
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/285589433_Judging_the_Judges_Measuring_Performance_of_District
_Court_Judges_in_Slovakia).	  
105	  For	  more	  see	  Spáč,	  supra	  note	  71,	  at	  90-­‐125.	  
1764 	   G e rman 	   L aw 	   J o u r n a l 	  	   Vol.	  19	  No.	  07	  
D.	  Discussion:	  Slovak	  Judicial	  Administration	  in	  the	  Context	  of	  Separation	  of	  Powers	  
Theories	  
	  
I.	  Repercussions	  of	  Judicial	  Self-­‐Government	  for	  the	  Principle	  of	  Separation	  of	  Powers	  
 
Despite	   expectations	   that	   the	   establishment	   of	   judicial	   councils	   should	   help	   insulate	   the	  
judiciary	  from	  undue	  influence,	  the	  previous	  sections	  showed	  that	  there	  are	  limits	  to	  such	  
assumptions.	   On	   one	   hand	   it	   is	   true	   that	   a	   greater	   level	   of	   JSG	   helped	   to	   insulate	   the	  
judiciary	   from	  direct	   political	   pressure.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   it	   allowed	   for	   an	  unexpected	  
capture	  of	   the	   judiciary	   ‘from	   inside’	   through	   rewarding	   the	  allies	  of	   those	   in	  power	  and	  
punishing	   their	   critics.	   These	   repercussions	   point	   at	   the	   drawbacks	   and	   limits	   inherently	  
tied	  with	   the	  establishment	  of	   strong	   judicial	   councils	   in	  post-­‐authoritarian,	   transitioning	  
countries.	  	  
	  
The	  mere	   idea	  of	   introducing	   the	   JCSR	   in	  2002	  was	   to	   shift	   the	   creative	  power	   from	   the	  
executive	   to	   an	   autonomous	   body,	   the	   JCSR,	   which	   newly	   gained	   wide	   discretion	   and	  
competence	   to	   decide	   on	   the	   appointment	   of	   new	   judges,	   promotion	   of	   judges,	  
appointments	   of	   disciplinary	   senates,	   etc.106	   The	   JCSR,	   an	   independent	   body	   widely	  
recommended	   by	   international	   bodies	   and	   observers,	   was	   believed	   to	   help	   insulate	   the	  
Slovak	  judiciary	  from	  undue	  political	  pressure.	  The	  main	  legislative	  amendments,	  targeting	  
the	   division	   of	   competences	   between	   the	  Minister	   of	   Justice,	   court	   presidents,	   and	   the	  
JCSR,	   therefore	   directly	   addressed	   the	   ‘checks	   and	  balances’	   aspect	   of	   the	   separation	   of	  
powers	  principle,107	  while	  other	  elements	  of	   the	  division	  of	  powers	  principle,	  such	  as	  the	  
separation	   of	   institutions,	   separation	   of	   functions,	   and	   personal	   incompatibility	   did	   not	  
really	   come	   into	  play.108	   Similarly,	   the	  question	  of	  democratic	  deficit	  was	  never	   raised	   in	  
the	  discussion.	  It	  seems	  that	  Slovak	  stakeholders	  perceived	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  judicial	  
council	  as	  a	  panacea	   for	   the	  mishaps	  of	   the	  previous	  Mečiar	  government	   in	   the	   judiciary	  
and	   one	   of	   the	   leverages	   that	   would	   help	   the	   country	   achieve	   an	   ideal,	   western	   type,	  
democratic	   political	   system.	   Hence	   the	   recommendations	   of	   the	   European	   Commission,	  
which	   strongly	   suggested	   that	   Slovakia	   should	   establish	   a	   judicial	   council,	   did	   not	   raise	  
questions	  of	  whether	  this	  institution	  suited	  the	  political	  and	  judicial	  environment	  or	  what	  
impact	  would	  it	  have.	  
	  
Strikingly,	  while	   the	  Slovak	  political	  system	  completely	   ignores	  the	  problem	  of	  “travelling	  
institutionaries”,	   a	   phenomena	   strongly	   present	   in	   the	   Slovak	   political	   culture	   and	  
judiciary,	  it	  almost	  obsessively	  adheres	  to	  checks	  and	  balances.	  Between	  two	  terms	  in	  the	  
                                            
106	  For	  more	  detail,	  see	  Section	  B.II.	  
107	  See	  Jeremy	  Waldron,	  Separation	  of	  Powers	  in	  Thought	  and	  Practice?,	  54	  BOSTON	  COLLEGE	  L.R.	  433	  (2013),	  at	  433;	  
and	  Christoph	  Möllers,	  THE	  THREE	  BRANCHES:	  A	  COMPARATIVE	  MODEL	  SEPARATION	  OF	  POWERS	  (2013).	  
108	  See	  Waldron,	  supra	  note	  106;	  or	  Möllers,	  supra	  note	  107.	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office	  of	  Chief	  Justice	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  and	  the	  President	  of	  the	  JCSR,	  Štefan	  Harabin	  
managed	   to	   serve	   for	   three	   years	   as	   Minister	   of	   Justice,	   effectively	   moving	   from	   one	  
branch	   to	   another	   and	   back.	   Additionally,	   he	   was	   not	   the	   only	   judge	   who	   eventually	  
returned	  to	   the	   judiciary	  who	  also	  served	  as	   the	  Minister	  of	   Justice.	  The	  same	  applies	   to	  
Harabin’s	   successor	   Viera	   Petríková,	   who	   moved	   from	   a	   small	   district	   court	   to	   the	  
governmental	   position	   only	   to	   be	   later	   promoted	   to	   the	   Supreme	   Court.	   Further,	   there	  
were	  two	   judges	  who	  have	  served	  as	  Deputy	  Ministers	  without	  ever	  resigning	   from	  their	  
judicial	  office.	  Daniel	  Hudák	  was	  Deputy	  Minister	  during	  Harabin’s	  and	  Petríková’s	   terms	  
between	  2006	  and	  2010,	  and	  after	  that	  moved	  back	  to	  the	  judiciary.	  Monika	  Jakovská	  has	  
served	  under	  two	  Ministers	  since	  2012	  until	  the	  present	  day,	  and	  is	  still	  officially	  listed	  as	  a	  
judge.	  Jankovská	  was	  even	  included	  on	  the	  party	  list	  of	  SMER-­‐SD	  in	  the	  2016	  parliamentary	  
elections,	  and	  Supreme	  Court	  Judge	  Peter	  Paluda	  ran	  for	  office	  in	  the	  2012	  parliamentary	  
elections.	  
	  
On	   the	   contrary,	   the	   process	   of	   selecting	   judges	   perfectly	   illustrates	   an	   almost	   comical	  
obsession	  with	  checks	  and	  balances.	  As	  many	  as	  four	  different	  bodies	  are	   involved	  in	  the	  
process	  of	  appointment	  to	  a	  judicial	  office.	  First,	  a	  selection	  committee	  consisting	  of	  both	  
judicial	  and	  political	  nominees	  tests	  a	  candidate’s	  competence	  to	  perform	  in	  the	  judiciary.	  
Second,	  the	  National	  Security	  Agency109	  vets	  the	  candidate’s	  background	  and	  ability	  to	  act	  
independently	   and	   impartially.	   Third,	   the	   JCSR,	   also	   a	   body	  with	   representatives	   of	   both	  
the	   judiciary	   and	   political	   branches,	   decides	   on	   nomination	   for	   the	   appointment.	   And	  
finally,	  a	  candidate	  assumes	  the	  office	  only	  after	  appointment	  by	  the	  president.	  
	  
It	   is	   however	  worth	  noting	   the	  historical	   and	   socio-­‐cultural	   background	  under	  which	   the	  
checks	  and	  balances	  principle	  represent	  an	  integral	  and	  important	  part	  of	  Slovakia’s	  early	  
political	  development.	  The	  power	  struggle	  between	  Mečiar	  and	  his	  political	  opponents	   in	  
the	   early	   transitioning	   era	   of	   1993-­‐1998	   represented	   a	   core	   of	   the	   Slovak	   Constitutional	  
Court’s	   case	   law	   even	   prior	   to	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   JCSR.	   The	   Slovak	   Constitutional	  
Court,	  under	  the	  gradual	  shift	  to	  semi-­‐authoritarianism,	  was	  typically	  petitioned	  with	  cases	  
regarding	   (1)	   interference	   with	   the	   independence	   of	   the	   NCSR	   (attempts	   to	   remove	  
unwanted	   designated	   deputies	   from	   their	   offices),110	   and	   (2)	   disputes	   and	   conflicts	  
between	   the	   President	   and	   PM	   Mečiar	   regarding	   the	   continual	   interference	   of	   the	  
government	  in	  what	  should	  have	  been	  presidential	  competences.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  in	  
the	   1994-­‐1998	   electoral	   term,	   the	   Slovak	   Constitutional	   Court	   typically	   acted	   as	   the	  
President’s	   ally,	   while	   President	   Kováč	   often	   used	   the	   Constitutional	   Court	   as	   leverage	  
                                            
109	   The	   requirement	   that	   the	   Agency	   provides	   security	   clearances	   of	   all	   new	   judges	   was	   introduced	   in	   the	  
Constitutional	  amendment	   in	  2014	   in	  Art.	  154d	  of	  the	  Slovak	  Constitution.	  For	  more	  see	  Erik	  Láštic	  and	  Samuel	  
Spáč,	  Slovakia	  /	  Slovaquie	  26	  EUROPEAN	  REVIEW	  OF	  PUBLIC	  LAW	  1209	  (2014).	  
110	   See	   Slovak	   Constitutional	   Court,	   judgement	   of	   June	   2,	   1993,	   I.	   ÚS	   39/93;	   or	   Slovak	   Constitutional	   Court,	  
judgement	  of	  November	  29,	  1995,	  PL.	  ÚS	  29/95;	  or	  Slovak	  Constitutional	  Court,	  judgement	  of	  July	  11,	  1996,	  I.	  ÚS	  
7/96.	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against	   Mečiar.	   The	   atmosphere	   of	   constant	   power	   struggles,	   lack	   of	   clear	   institutional	  
boundaries,	   and	   strong	   anti-­‐Mečiar	   sentiments	   created	   a	   pressing	   need	   to	   anchor	  
constitutional	   institutions,	  set	  the	  boundaries	  of	  their	  power,	  and	  secure	  an	   independent	  
judiciary.	  Some	  competence	  disputes	  continued	  to	  appear	  before	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  
as	   late	   as	   in	   the	   2010s,	   especially	   during	   government	   attempts	   to	   remove	   some	   Judicial	  
Council	  members	  with	  close	  ties	  to	  Mečiar’s	  regime	  from	  office.111	  Another	  huge	  cluster	  of	  
cases	  regarded	  the	  refusal	  of	  President	  Gašparovič	  to	  nominate	  new	  Constitutional	  Court	  
judges,	  although	  they	  had	  already	  been	  approved	  by	  the	  parliament.112	  	  
	  
II.	  JCSR	  and	  the	  Politicization	  of	  the	  Slovak	  Judiciary	  
 
While	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  represented	  an	  influential	  actor	  in	  the	  separation	  of	  powers	  
(mostly	   checks	   and	   balances)	   principle	   and	   policies,	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   JCSR	  
paradoxically	   reduced	   its	   influence.	   As	   a	   body	   established	   by	   the	   Constitution,	   the	  
Constitutional	  Court	  had	  to	  treat	  it	  as	  a	  constitutional	  authority,	  and	  therefore	  with	  much	  
more	  constraint	  when	  it	  came	  to	  the	  review	  of	  JCSR’s	  actions.	  	  
	  
When	  we	  attempt	  to	  answer	  the	  question	  whether	  the	  JCSR	  itself	  managed	  to	  depoliticize	  
the	  Slovak	   judiciary,	   the	  results	  are,	  at	  best,	  dubious.	   It	   is	  however	  crucial	   to	  understand	  
the	  broader	  political	  context	  and	  atmosphere	   in	  which	   the	   JCSR	  was	  operating.	  First,	   the	  
standing	  judges	  and	  especially	  the	  incumbent	  Chief	  Justice	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  Harabin,	  
allied	  with	  Mečiar,	  stretched	  and	  complicated	  the	  process	  of	  establishing	  the	  JCSR	  as	  much	  
as	  possible.	   Second,	   the	  period	  of	   calm	  under	   the	  new	  chairmanship	  of	  Milan	  Karabín	   in	  
2003	   was	   short	   lived.	   The	   parliamentary	   elections	   of	   2006	   returned	   Mečiar	   to	   the	  
governing	  coalition,	  whose	  Prime	  Minister	  Fico	  allowed	  Harabin	  to	  become	  the	  Minister	  of	  
Justice.	  At	  this	  point,	  Harabin	  changed	  his	  strategy	  of	  being	  critical	  of	  the	  JCSR	  and	  started	  
preparing	  the	  ground	  to	  cement	  his	  own	  influence	  in	  the	  judiciary	  by	  entering	  the	  JCSR	  as	  
its	  president.	  As	   the	  Minister	  of	   Justice,	  Harabin	  therefore	  supported	  the	  wide	  discretion	  
and	   broadening	   of	   the	   JCSR’s	   competences.	   This	   idea	   was	   initially	   supported	   by	   Fico’s	  
government,	  which	  was	   a	   strong	   proponent	   of	   JSG.	   Harabin	  was	   able	   to	   hand-­‐pick	   JCSR	  
members	  both	   for	   the	   government	   and	   legislature,	  maintained	   sufficient	   support	   among	  
judges	   thanks	   to	   his	   carrots	   and	   sticks	   policy	   (rewarding	   allies	   and	   punishing	   critics),	  
orchestrated	   his	   own	   comeback	   and	   appointment	   as	   the	   future	   Chief	   Justice	   of	   the	  
Supreme	  Court,	  and	  hence,	  as	  the	  JCSR	  chairman.	  Harabin’s	  initial	  popularity	  was	  built	  on	  
strong	   ties	   among	   judges	   in	   Eastern	   Slovakia	   and,	   paradoxically,	   a	   rhetoric	   of	   an	  
independent	  judiciary	  in	  which	  judges	  know	  best	  how	  to	  govern	  and	  regulate	  the	  system.	  
                                            
111	   Especially	   the	   removal	   of	   Harabin	   from	   the	   presidential	   post	   in	   the	   JCSR.	   See	   Slovak	   Constitutional	   Court,	  
resolution	  of	  February,	  17	  2011,	  IV.	  ÚS	  46/2011.	  
112	  Ref.	  Here,	  SCC	  was	  heavily	   inspired	  by	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  Czech	  Constitutional	  Court,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  
Chief	  Justice	  informally	  approached	  the	  CCC	  asking	  for	  a	  solution	  which	  CCC	  had	  implemented	  in	  past,	  when	  faced	  
with	  President	  Klaus’s	  refusal	  of	  to	  nominate	  new	  judges.	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The	  political	   salience	  of	   the	   topic	  and	   the	   level	  of	   governmental	   inference,	  nevertheless,	  
did	   not	   cease	   completely	   after	   the	   change	   of	   government	   in	   the	   2010	   election.	   On	   the	  
contrary,	   the	  new	  Minister	  of	   Justice,	   Žitňanská,	   entered	   into	   an	  open	  war	  with	  Harabin	  
over	   a	   series	   of	   attempted	   reforms,	   and	   the	   new	   SMER	   government	   continued	   in	   these	  
efforts	  during	  2012-­‐2016.	  Interestingly,	  Harabin	  was	  eventually	  becoming	  more	  and	  more	  
toxic	  and	  finally,	  the	  entire	  political	  sphere	  stood	  united	  in	  the	  view	  that	  Harabin	  should	  be	  
removed.	   This	   happened	   in	   2014,	   when	   the	   JCSR	   elected	   a	   new	   Chief	   Justice	   of	   the	  
Supreme	  Court	  as	  well	  as	  President	  of	  the	  JCSR.	  
	  
E.	  Conclusion:	  JCSR	  and	  the	  Position	  of	  the	  Slovak	  Judiciary	  within	  the	  Political	  System	  
 
As	  shown	   in	   the	  previous	  sections,	  Slovakia,	   in	   the	  atmosphere	  of	  post-­‐Mečiar	  optimistic	  
Europeanization	   and	   under	   the	   political	   pressure	   of	   the	   European	   Commission	   and	   the	  
Council	   of	   Europe,	   adopted	   the	   recommended	   model	   of	   judicial	   council	   with	   the	  
predominant	   influence	   of	   judges.	   The	   introduction	   of	   the	   judicial	   council	   significantly	  
shifted	   the	   picture	   and	   the	   competences	   of	   bodies	   (and	   the	   representation	   of	   other	  
branches	   of	   power)	   on	   the	   JSG,	   with	   the	   JCSR	   clearly	   being	   the	   most	   powerful	   and	  
influential	  actor.	  Compared	  with	  pre-­‐2002,	  the	   influence	  of	  other	  branches	  of	  power	  was	  
significantly	  diminished,	   especially	   for	   the	  parliament.	  Although	   the	   court	  presidents	   still	  
hold	  strong	  competences,	  they	  rarely	  act	  on	  them.	  	  
	  
This	  article	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  influence	  of	  such	  a	  strong	  model	  of	  judicial	  council	  and	  
the	   separation	  of	   the	   judiciary	   from	   the	   influence	  of	  other	  political	  branches	   is	  not	   clear	  
cut.	   The	   article	   aimed	   to	   address	  both	   structural	   changes	   in	   judicial	   self-­‐governance	   and	  
their	   relationship	   to	   five	   core	   values	   inherent	   to	   the	   judiciary:	   independence,	  
accountability,	   legitimacy,	   transparency,	   and	   public	   confidence	   and	   the	   trust	   in	   courts.	  
Based	   on	   an	   in-­‐depth	   analysis,	   we	   can	   conclude	   that	   the	   association	   between	   the	  
establishment	  of	  the	  JCSR	  and	  potential	  improvement	  in	  these	  values	  is,	  at	  best,	  dubious.	  
While	   formally,	   several	   mechanisms	   and	   competences	   fostering	   the	   independence	   and	  
accountability	   of	   judiciary	   were	   introduced,	   their	   effect	   was	   diminished	   by	   continuing	  
political	  struggles	  surrounding	  the	  JCSR.	  Moreover,	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  often	  a	  played	  
much	  more	   important	   role	   in	  protecting	   these	  principles	   than	   the	   JCSR	   itself.	  The	  overall	  
level	  of	  distrust	  in	  the	  courts	  rose	  significantly	  between	  1997	  and	  2002,	  and	  has	  remained	  
very	  high	  until	  now.	  The	  introduction	  of	  the	  JCSR	  has	  not	  helped	  to	  lessen	  it.	  	  
	  
Finally,	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  JSCR	  on	  the	  position	  of	  the	  Slovak	  judiciary	  within	  the	  separation	  
of	   powers	   principle	   was	   twofold.	   First,	   the	   wide	   discretion	   and	   most	   of	   the	   JSG	  
competences	  were	  vested	  in	  the	  JCSR,	  which	  is,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  truly	  independent	  of	  the	  
government	   and	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Justice.	   Judges	   have	   particularly	   strong	   influence	   over	  
selection,	   promotion,	   and	   disciplinary	   procedures.	   Moreover,	   the	   JCSR	   is	   more	   or	   less	  
controlled	  by	  judges,	  with	  most	  of	  its	  members	  hand-­‐picked	  in	  the	  last	  appointment	  round	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by	  the	  Association	  of	  Judges	  of	  Slovakia.	  With	  the	  help	  of	  politicians,	  the	  JCSR	  was	  hijacked	  
by	  judges	  who	  used	  their	  powers	  to	  capture	  the	  judiciary	  from	  inside,	  and	  they	  have	  used	  
their	  powers	  in	  such	  a	  manner	  that	  helps	  them	  to	  protect	  their	  interests.	  
	  
	  
